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9FOREWORD
The Government Security and Defence Policy Report, built on the comprehensive 
concept of security, is presented to Parliament in accordance with the 
Government Programme. The Report lays the foundation for guiding Finland’s 
policy and strengthening its action in promoting Finland’s interests and goals 
in the changing international situation.
The Report analyses the changes, trends and the global security environment, 
as well as the conclusions based on these, Finland’s security policy, the 
development of defence and actions to secure the vital functions of society. 
Accordingly, the Report reviews a wide range of instruments.  
The Government Security and Defence Policy Report is the latest in a series of 
Government Reports issued on the subject. Special attention is given to topics 
in which signi?cant changes have either occurred since the ???? Report, or 
are foreseen. 
The Report does not repeat the content or topics of speci?c policy documents 
that supplement the Security and Defence Policy Report.
The focus of the Report e?tends into the ????s. Due to the long?term nature 
of defence procurement, planning cycles and mid?life updates, defence 
development in particular requires analysis and guidelines that extend into the 
next decade.
The practice of issuing Reports aims to gain broad political consensus and the 
support of the citizens on Finland’s security and defence policy.
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SUMMARY
The summary describes the fundamental aspects of Finnish security and 
defence policy and focuses on the factors which are particularly important in 
Finland’s security environment, and which impact Finland’s key policy choices.
The most important goals of Finland’s foreign, security and defence policy 
are safeguarding the country’s independence and territorial sovereignty, 
guaranteeing the basic values, security and well?being of the population and 
maintaining a functioning society.
Finland’s security policy encompasses both actively creating security and 
anticipating and responding to security threats. Defence policy supports the 
goals of the security policy. Ensuring Finland’s security calls for the use of a 
wide range of foreign, security and defence policy instruments.
Finland’s security is built on good bilateral relations, exerting maximum 
in?uence in the European ?nion ?E?? and broad?based cooperation with other 
states and international actors. Finland participates in international burden?
sharing, the creation of viable global governance and solving international 
problems. 
Finland’s security and defence policy guidelines are characterised by continuity, 
transparency and a strong commitment to European and international 
cooperation. These are epitomised by active participation in the development 
of the E?’s common security and defence policy, ?AT? partnership, ?ordic 
cooperation and international crisis management.
The security environment and the impact of the changes in it
Globalisation has intensi?ed the interdependence between states which is 
a fundamentally positive factor. The states that have experienced economic 
success have increased their international in?uence. Technological development 
has revolutionised the possibilities for global communications and dialogue. The 
increasing signi?cance of non?state actors in shaping the security environment 
has been a central phenomenon. ?owever, non?state actors can also create 
instability. Population growth and climate change, the principal trends at the 
global level, are continuing and increasingly impact the security of states and 
citizens in many ways.
Changes in the security environment also impact global governance and the 
efforts to change the structures of the international system. The signi?cance 
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of commonly accepted rules and procedures is growing, and the importance 
of the ?nited ?ations ???? as the sole world organisation is accentuated. 
The ?? Security Council has a central role in legitimising universally binding 
international decisions.
Finland can best guarantee its security and well?being by actively participating 
in strengthening both global and European security structures as well as the 
security structures in the neighbourhood and by participating in international 
cooperation. Finland needs to ensure preparedness for external security 
challenges which are dif?cult to foresee. Finland’s objective is that international 
cooperation be built on transparency and the promotion of human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law as well as compliance with international law.
The changes in global power structures that have taken place in recent 
years have primarily been the result of differences in countries’ economic 
development. While the western economies have suffered from anaemic 
growth, China, especially, has been overwhelmingly successful. This has not, 
however, altered the status of the ?nited States as the most in?uential country 
in the world.
Finland highlights the importance of the cohesion of the European ?nion 
and comprehensive E? policies vis???vis its strategic partners, such as China, 
the ?nited States and Russia. Simultaneously, Finland continues to foster its 
bilateral relations with countries central to global policy and the world economy.
The ?nited States is shifting the focus of its international politics to Asia, but it 
will remain a strong actor in Europe. Finland strives for broad?based bilateral 
cooperation with the ?nited States.
Russia is Finland’s biggest trading partner, but the signi?cance of the two being 
neighbouring countries greatly transcends that of their economic relations. 
The wide?ranging relations encompass active political dialogue, cooperation 
between the authorities and increasing interaction at the level of the citizen. 
Russia’s foreign and security policy guidelines, its societal development and the 
state and development prospects of the major military power are, naturally, 
issues that interest Finland. It is in Finland’s interest that Russia increasingly 
commits to European development, international collaboration and integrates 
into the structures of the global economy. The development of E??Russian 
cooperation in the ?eld of foreign and security policy is also an important goal 
which Finland supports. 
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?embership of the European ?nion is a fundamental value?based choice for 
Finland. It also includes a strong security policy dimension. It is important 
for Finland that the ?nion retain its role in preserving stability in Europe and 
its signi?cance as a security community. The development of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy ?CFSP? and the Common Security and Defence 
Policy ?CSDP?, to which Finland is committed, supports the aforementioned 
goal. Furthermore, the solidarity clause and the mutual assistance clause 
included in the Treaty of ?isbon bolster the character of the ?nion as a security 
community. E? enlargement, an effective and comprehensive European 
?eighbourhood Policy and the efforts to strengthen common values through 
the ?rganization for Security and Co?operation in Europe ??SCE? promote the 
development of a value?based community in Europe. The development of E? 
crisis management capabilities strengthens the ?nion’s credibility as a global 
actor. Simultaneously, membership of the ?nion provides a central channel for 
advancing international and global goals that are nationally important.
The ?nion is a major actor in many key areas related to societal development 
and comprehensive security. The common foreign and security policy, climate 
and energy policy, action combating terrorism and organised crime, border 
management, immigration policy, promotion of rules?based free trade and 
sustainable development are but examples of the E?’s efforts intended 
to impact global development and threat scenarios, and to strengthen the 
international leverage of the ?nion. Exerting in?uence actively and coherently 
in the E? serves Finland’s interests.
As a result of the Eurozone crisis the European ?nion is in a dif?cult situation. 
The weakening of the ?nion’s internal unity, it experiencing more discord 
or losing its capacity would impact the E?’s global role and also Finland’s 
international standing. Finland aims to strengthen the E?’s cohesion and its 
capacity to act internationally in all relevant areas.
The ?ordic countries are an important and natural reference group for Finland. 
Within the ?ordic community there is broad consensus on societal goals and 
the countries are committed to the promotion of the ?ordic model. The ?ordic 
countries have similar views regarding the advancement of the rule of law, 
human rights, gender equality and sustainable development. A tradition of 
active and practical cooperation exists between the civilian authorities. 
Finland promotes the development of ?ordic cooperation in foreign, security 
and defence policy as well. This bolsters the role of the ?ordic countries as 
an international actor, and promotes stability in ?orthern Europe and the 
northern regions. ?ordic Defence Cooperation ???RDEFC?? is a ?exible way 
13
to improve interoperability, compatibility and cost?effectiveness. The idea of 
?ordic cooperation in the air surveillance of Iceland is seen as a concrete 
opportunity for closer cooperation in the near future.
The transatlantic connection between ?orth America and Europe materialises, 
?rst and foremost, in their interlinked economies. The cornerstone of 
transatlantic security policy is ?AT?, which advances security and stability 
in Europe. For Finland, partnership cooperation with ?AT? is important and 
Finland actively participates in the wide?ranging development of ?AT?’s 
partnership policy.
Comprehensive participation in international crisis management ???, E?, 
?AT? and ?SCE? is an integral element of Finland’s foreign, security and 
defence policy. Decisions taken on crisis management participation will be 
made from the foreign and security policy perspective, taking into account the 
needs of the con?ict area and the operation in question, available capabilities 
and ?nancial resources. Finnish participation in military crisis management 
corresponds to the level of Finland’s long?term commitment to the preservation 
and development of international peace and stability. This bolsters Finland’s 
standing and demonstrates a clear willingness to participate in international 
burden?sharing.
Finland’s civilian crisis management participation continues to emphasise 
expertise of a high standard in police, rule of law, border management, human 
rights and gender equality issues. Finland is also striving to improve its impact 
in civilian crisis management. The goal is to second approximately ??? Finnish 
experts to civilian crisis management missions.
Finland develops its crisis management capabilities by participating in 
multinational training and exercises organised by the European ?nion, ?nited 
?ations and ?AT? as well as its ?ember States and partner countries. ?et 
another goal is to continue and improve ?ordic cooperation in international 
crisis management operations.
Advancing all sectors of the Treaty on the ?on?Proliferation of ?uclear Weapons, 
including the non?proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, requires a 
strong commitment from the international community and robust collaborative 
regimes. Finland is committed to the strengthening and intensi?cation of these 
regimes.
Growing interdependence and the increasingly technological operating 
environment also bring a new kind of vulnerability of society to the forefront. 
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?odern, network?based societal structures are increasingly dependent on critical 
infrastructure, which includes, among other things, transport, communications 
and energy supply. Since nearly all critical functions and services of society 
depend on technical systems that use electricity and telecommunications, the 
risk of serious disruptions in society becomes all the more serious. This kind of 
challenge to the comprehensive security of society can be met by developing 
comprehensive security thinking and cooperation. It is a necessary requirement 
in securing the vital functions of society in all conditions. The near?term focus 
will be on securing the cyber domain, critical to the information society.
In addition to the traditional military threat scenario the comprehensive 
concept of security covers a number of different topics, phenomena and 
challenges such as climate change, scarcity of energy and water resources, 
population growth and migrations, terrorism, infectious diseases, organised 
crime in its different forms, such as drug and human traf?cking, cyber attacks 
and the increasing vulnerability of society. These issues progressively impact 
international cooperation and also Finland’s security environment. 
Economically, socially and ecologically sound development is the precondition 
of comprehensive global security. ?perating under the pressure of changes 
Finland must foster international cooperation, participate in strengthening 
security in its neighbourhood and elsewhere in Europe, and prepare to respond 
to various security challenges at many levels. 
When it comes to Finland’s neighbouring areas, on the one hand the changes 
visible in the Arctic neighbourhood add to the economic appeal of the region 
and, on the other hand, highlight the need for sustainable action. Changes in 
the appeal of the region also translate into a rise of security policy interest in 
the area.
Defence development 
Finland’s present security environment is stable. Factors affecting security such 
as the unpredictability of the operating environment and uncertainty may also 
cause negative security impacts on Finland. A wider European con?ict or a 
regional crisis may result in using political pressure or military force against 
Finland. While the threat of large?scale armed aggression is low, it cannot 
categorically be ruled out. Military force can also be used in a limited fashion as 
part of political or economic pressure. Finland must continue to ensure its own 
defence capability. Developments in the operating environment require that 
the defence doctrine and the operating principles of the forces be continually 
improved.
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The primary purpose of the defence capability is to establish deterrence against 
the use of military force and the threat thereof. As a militarily non?aligned 
country Finland prepares to repel military threats without outside assistance. 
Consequently, it maintains all of the capability areas in the defence system. 
?evertheless, the defence capability and its development increasingly depend 
on national and international cooperation.
Military defence is an integral part of society’s comprehensive security. 
Preparedness for wide?ranging security threats demands networking between 
the defence establishment, society and the business community as well as 
close international cooperation. The Defence Forces’ resources will also be 
used in support of the other authorities.
Multinational defence cooperation and participation in military crisis 
management strengthen Finland’s defence capability. Cooperation can be 
carried out between several entities while avoiding duplication. Active defence 
cooperation bolsters deterrence and defence, and ensures the development of 
military capabilities. Cooperation facilitates the reception of political support and 
host nation support, should Finland’s resources prove insuf?cient. Reciprocally, 
Finland must be prepared and able to provide military and other assistance 
to others when required. Cooperation is carried out under the auspices of 
the E? and ?AT? partnership, in regional groups and bilaterally. The E? and 
?AT? play supportive roles in multinational projects. Concrete cooperation 
between willing countries occurs in groupings, of which the most important 
from Finland’s perspective is the ?ordic defence cooperation arrangement 
??RDEFC?. ?ther collaborative countries important to Finland include the 
countries in ?orthern Europe and the ?nited States. Finland cooperates with 
the ?nited States especially in the ?eld of defence materiel.
In ???? the wartime strength of the Defence Forces will be approximately 
??? ??? troops. The aim is to have more capable units and weapon systems 
in order to compensate for the reduction in troop strengths. The formation of 
the new regional units alongside operational and territorial units will bolster 
the local defence capability.
Military defence is built on long?term and consistent planning, extending beyond 
several Government terms. The Defence Forces Reform will be implemented 
by ????. The reform is a necessary precondition for the capacity and further 
development of the Defence Forces while the defence for the ????s is being 
built. The political guidelines related to maintenance and development of the 
defence capability must take into account the capabilities’ entire life cycle. It is 
important to prepare for the key challenges to the defence capability already 
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during the ongoing decade, and capability planning must extend all the way 
to the ????s.
Finland will continue to see to its own defence. The defence solution is built 
on a territorial defence system covering the entire area of the country and 
general conscription will remain one of its cornerstones. The key objectives of 
Finland’s defence policy are the maintenance of a defence capability tailored to 
the security environment and resources, and the development of the defence 
as part of comprehensive security, and intensifying multinational defence 
cooperation.
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THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
1 Security in the global transition 
1.1 Interdependence and indivisible security
Global trends
The development of Finland, like that of other countries, is increasingly 
connected to globalisation and changes in the international environment. 
Simultaneously, security?related challenges and cross?border threats are more 
frequently multidimensional and interconnected, and require the utilisation of 
a wide range of instruments. It is justi?ed to analyse the security environment 
and make policy decisions on the basis of a comprehensive concept of security.
Greater interdependence affects the everyday life of people and societies in 
countless ways. Each state is dependent upon others as it takes decisions 
regarding its economy, societal development and security. Therefore, it 
is necessary to ?nd common solutions to bring the challenges related to 
sustainable development and security under shared governance.
Population growth and climate change are the most important factors affecting 
long?term global security. Since the end of the Second World War the world’s 
population has tripled. Population growth heavily stresses the environment 
and natural resources as well as economic and societal structures. At the same 
time the world is rapidly urbanising. 
The advancing climate change impacts security both locally and globally. ?atural 
disasters and widespread damage to the environment weaken human security 
and cause con?icts. The effects of climate change are felt more and more 
widely geographically. The melting Arctic ice cap is a striking phenomenon in 
Finland’s neighbouring areas, which also has global consequences. 
Demand for raw materials and energy does not only continue to grow in step 
with the population growth and, especially, the economic growth of developing 
countries, but also with the increasing consumption in industrialised countries. 
There is growing concern over energy security. There will be progressively 
more competition, locally and globally, over vital commodities such as water 
and food. Guaranteeing the availability of natural resources requires the 
strengthening of rules?based cooperation based on openness.  
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Increasing inequalities within and between states and regions as well as 
continuing widespread poverty reduce security in many ways.The potential for 
con?ict also arises from the state of affairs within societies. When intertwined, 
imbalanced economic and social development, internal con?icts, violations of 
democracy and human rights as well as a non?existent rule of law can diminish 
the viability and legitimacy of states.
The correlation between sustainable development and security is becoming 
increasingly apparent. More effective climate change mitigation and adaptation 
as well as the integration of ecological, social and economic development in a 
sustainable way are all critical to the future of humankind. 
Regional and local con?icts continue to challenge global security. The 
consequences of con?ict, such as refugee ?ows, have ever more often spillover 
effects beyond their immediate surroundings. Particularly the condition of fragile 
states may turn into wider con?icts, resulting in humanitarian crises. Con?ict?
prone and fragile states may provide a fertile environment for extremism and 
terrorism as well as organised crime.
Sudden negative shifts in the economy add to societal uncertainty and, when 
exacerbated, can cause unrest even in established democracies.
In an interdependent world it is more and more dif?cult to advance national 
interests by means of military power politics, nor would they achieve lasting 
results the way they did in the past. However, even though the viability of force 
as an instrument of policy has diminished, military capabilities still matter, 
especially as the dimension of regional in?uence.
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Climate change and its impact on security 
Climate change has far-reaching ecological impacts which manifest themselves in signiﬁcant 
human security dimensions such as decreasing food security, water scarcity, depletion of 
arable land, shortage of energy and growing uncontrollable migrations both inside and 
between states. It is estimated that the world’s population will exceed 9 billion in 2050, 
which highlights the need for more effective common governance mechanisms and rules for 
the exploitation and use of global public goods and natural resources. The effects of climate 
change can also increase the number of conﬂicts.
Security threats caused by climate change include economic impacts and dangers to critical 
infrastructure, particularly in coastal cities, land erosion and border disputes as sea areas 
expand, increasing mass migrations from areas that are the worst affected by climate change, 
as well as conﬂicts over resources. The tension and negative effects created by climate change 
are most visibly apparent in already fragile and crisis-prone areas as well as in politically and 
economically conﬂict volatile societies which do not have sufﬁcient adaptation capability. 
Proper preparedness can signiﬁcantly mitigate the human and economic losses caused by 
natural disasters, in particular. 
For example, the underlying cause of the conﬂicts in Darfur, Sudan, is a dispute over pasture 
lands and arable land between nomadic tribes and those practicing traditional agriculture. 
Water depletion can easily increase the already hostile relations in the Middle East. Climate 
change will make it easier to exploit the natural resources of the Arctic region such as oil, 
natural gas and rare earth metals. This can trigger competition between industrialised 
countries as well. At the same time the signiﬁcance of international treaty arrangements and 
the international law is highlighted.
Factbox: Global population growth from 1920–2011, forecast for 2012–2050, page 114
Factbox: The evolution of violent conﬂict, page 114
Need for global governance
Growing interdependence and globalisation – though extremely positive 
phenomena as such – pose entirely new challenges to the way communities, 
states and nations organise their mutual relationships and adapt to the 
requirements posed by sustainable development. The maintenance and 
development of security in a globalised, interdependent operating environment 
demands progressively more international cooperation, credible international 
institutions as well as an active foreign, security and defence policy.
The structures created in the aftermath of World War II, including the shared 
norms and institutions, will continue to serve as the base for international 
order. However, non?state actors such as non?governmental organisations 
??G??, different networks, businesses and the social media are ever more 
important as agents of change and reformers of global cooperation. They can 
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increasingly challenge and supplement the operating modes of states and 
international organisations in con?icts and con?ict resolution. 
In a globalised world a properly functioning international system is in the 
shared interest of states. This improves the conditions for cooperation. The 
need to develop the structures and instruments of global governance is 
highlighted, because the existing institutions and their operating principles 
no longer fully correspond to the changes in the operating environment and 
power relations. This has been seen, for example, in multilateral climate change 
talks. Globalisation and interdependence also increase vulnerability when the 
consequences of problems rapidly spread far and wide.
International power relations
Changes in the economic power relations are re?ected in international power 
relations. The emerging economies, particularly China, are increasing their 
political clout by means of their strong economic growth. While the ?nited 
States will continue to be the most in?uential country in global politics, it has 
lost some of its stature. Also the in?uence of the other established western 
powers, especially the E?, which is in the throes of an economic and debt 
crisis, has weakened in relation to the countries experiencing rapid economic 
growth. The western countries are in debt and facing a period of meagre 
growth. Despite the fact that the growth rates of the emerging economies will 
slow down in the coming years and that they need to institute social reforms, 
the transformation in the balance of power will continue.
In addition to the increasing in?uence of the large emerging economies many 
other states such as Indonesia and Turkey have raised their political and 
economic clout, both regionally and globally. Furthermore, several regional 
groupings and organisations such as the African ?nion ?A?? and the Economic 
Community of West African States ?EC?WAS? have strengthened their role. 
Globalisation has brought nearly every country into the sphere of the global 
marketplace. The integration of large developing countries like China, India 
and Brazil into the global economy has entailed a major upheaval. Globalisation 
has facilitated sustained and rapid economic growth, which is gradually moving 
the hub of production away from Europe and the ?nited States. In recent years 
the emerging economies in Asia have borne the brunt of the global economic 
growth. In addition, the economic relations between the southern hemisphere 
economies have become more intense, and global economic interaction and 
the total volume of investments have signi?cantly grown.
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The role of the economy in power relations has grown along with interdependence 
and prolonged economic imbalances. The underlying causes of the weakening 
growth potential include internal factors such as slowing population growth 
rates and ageing. Painful decisions in society have to be taken to stop the 
growing indebtedness of states. At the same time, ensuring the recovery 
capability of the economy and society and preserving equality between the 
generations are key challenges. It is important to develop versatile indicators 
alongside the Gross ?ational Product ?G?P? which also measure well?being. 
Chronic ?nancing shortages and indebtedness have increased the vulnerability 
of countries. A constant ?ow of new technological breakthroughs is required to 
sustain economic growth. 
Economic and monetary policy plays an important role in power relations, 
such as in the Sino??S relationship. China is one of the major creditors of 
the ?SA and China’s dollar?based assets are primarily invested in ?S treasury 
bonds. Whereas the ?nited States demands that China revalue its currency 
and correct its trade imbalance with the ?SA, China, for its part, criticises the 
?nited States over its monetary and ?nancial policy, hoping to see stability?
building solutions. 
GDP development from 2000–2011, forecast for 2012–2017
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Burden-sharing in global questions 
Irrespective of the changes in the balance of power the West still projects the 
most power, and bears the brunt of the international response to global and 
cross?border problems, security challenges and hurdles to progress. ?ver the 
long term, the key questions are whether the emerging countries will assume 
more responsibility for solving global problems and how their respective 
interrelationships and their relations with established democracies will develop 
in the conditions of international structural transformation.
The shift in the balance of power has also become evident in international 
organisations such as the ??, the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund ?IMF?? it has also impacted their role in global governance. Be that as it 
may, the post?WWII structures, including their standards and institutions, will 
continue to serve as the basis of the international order. Due to the changing 
power relations, decision?making systems are facing increasing pressures to 
change. However, in the ??, for example, progress has not been suf?cient.
The gloomy outlook for the global economy causes distrust on several levels, 
which can also emerge in increasing protectionism and nationalism. This 
simultaneously challenges the maintenance and development of a transparent 
and rules?based collaborative international order. The emerging countries, as 
well, have relied on the present, rules?based international system, which has 
facilitated their economic growth, nor are they offering any alternatives to this 
structure.
The rules?based and collaborative international order relies on the respect of 
international law, the consolidation of democracy and the safeguarding of the 
rule of law and human rights, which are the key values of the E? and states 
committed to democracy. As the so?called Arab Spring recently demonstrated, 
they epitomise the overall appeal of western democracies. These values, 
sometimes referred to as western values, are universal values adopted by the 
?? and legal standards based on international agreements. 
It is apparent that the emerging countries also diverge regarding their views 
on the values and principles on which international cooperation should be 
built. ?uestions related to self?determination as well as views on international 
interventions and the use of sanctions have taken centre stage. The basic 
premises of Brazil, India, South Africa and other democratic states may be 
different than those of many other emerging powers. Differing values may 
result in pressure to change the international system as well as in paralysis 
during con?icts.
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Signiﬁcance of comprehensive security questions
Due to growing global interdependence the external and internal security of 
states are more closely intertwined than before. The prevention of threats 
as well as preparedness requires civilian and military resources from society. 
Cross?border threats such as organised crime, terrorism, traf?cking in narcotics 
and humans, infectious diseases, environmental threats, disruptions in energy 
supply and cyber attacks continue to grow in importance. International 
contingency planning cooperation between states is increasing. 
?ncertainty in economic growth continues. At the same time the business 
sector and the civil society are assuming more important roles as regards 
securing the vital functions of society. This transformation accelerates as the 
public sector is being adapted to balancing the economy. Long, even global, 
value chains along with the globalisation of businesses reduce the options of the 
national authorities in regulating, steering or monitoring business operations.
Modern, network?based societal structures are increasingly dependent on critical 
infrastructure, which includes, among other things, transport, communications 
and energy supply. Simultaneously, the vulnerability of this infrastructure only 
increases. Practically all critical functions and services of society depend on 
technical systems that use electricity and telecommunications. As wireless 
communications and system networking become ubiquitous the risk of serious 
disruptions in society becomes all the more serious.
Along with technological advances it becomes increasingly easier for non?state 
actors to cause harm. Asymmetric and highly destructive means are developed 
to counter an adversary’s technological and material supremacy. Asymmetric 
means can also be used against society in general, rather than the armed forces 
alone. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear ?CBR?? threats, terrorism 
and cyber attacks can cause severe, rapidly escalating crises. Preventing and 
repelling them requires comprehensive preparedness. 
Securing the global commons ?freedom of the seas, the atmosphere and man?
made cyberspace? and protecting the free and reliable use of cyberspace are 
questions of growing importance. The phenomenon highlights the importance 
of international regulations. The ?nited ?ations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea ???CL?S? lays a comprehensive foundation for all use of the world’s seas 
and all conservation measures relating to them. For example, its central role 
has been brought to the forefront in the Arctic region.
Disruptions in the cyber domain, especially, present a critical threat. The causes 
of cyber threats include vulnerabilities within networks as well as hackers 
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that deliberately cause damage or illegally search for information. Extensive 
networks are exposed to accidental disruptions as well. It will become more 
dif?cult to distinguish between state?sponsored and non?state sponsored cyber 
attacks or to determine the source of the threats.
Cyber security issues cause con?ict and division within the international 
community. Their underlying causes include economic and security interests 
as well as diverging views on human rights and the role of the state vis???
vis individual freedom. Cooperation is presently being developed in the E?, 
?AT?, the ?SCE and the ?? as well as among different country groupings. 
Many states are developing their capability to defend themselves against cyber 
attacks and to project different forms of countermeasures on the adversary. 
Cyber questions are vital topics as regards military security and securing the 
vital functions of society.
A new era has dawned in the cyber domain: malware can now impact all vital 
functions of society through industrial automation and programmable logic 
controllers. Technological progress in cyberspace increases the risk of new 
threats. Finland, too, has already been the target of internal and external cyber 
operations. 
Energy security is a growing challenge in many areas of the world, Europe 
included. The E? imports more than half of the energy it consumes and the 
relative share of imported energy keeps on growing. Energy imports are 
increasingly concentrated, since Russia has become the leading exporter of 
crude oil, coal and natural gas. At the same time the E? area has incorporated 
important policies on the increased use of renewables and energy saving 
measures. The intention is to respond to the energy security challenge by 
expanding the energy base, its suppliers and transit routes, and by promoting 
good governance and respect for the rule of law as well as through investments 
in the countries of origin. The E? actively pursues these goals.
The E? aims to strengthen the European Energy Policy. The policy takes into 
account the internal market as well as environmental questions. Within certain 
constraints, it is up to the Member States to choose their energy sources. 
The E? should further develop an energy policy that considers both internal 
and external dimensions, a more harmonised energy market as well as crisis 
mechanisms capable of handling temporary disruptions in energy supplies.
The safety of nuclear power plants is a key question both internationally 
and regionally. Whereas each country is responsible for its nuclear safety, 
international conventions, norms and standards are actively being developed, 
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especially within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
?IAEA?. The E? is the ?rst major regional actor in the ?eld of nuclear energy 
that legislates nuclear safety.
Equal access to clean water is a growing ecological and political challenge. 
Water resources and their poor state cause tension between different forms 
of use and users both within and between countries and can even result in 
instability or con?ict. ?n the other hand, joint management of shared water 
resources achieved by strengthening international agreements can help 
alleviate tensions. This applies to other key commodities and strategic raw 
materials as well. ?n these topics as well the E? will develop international 
cooperation and its in?uence as part of its external action.
While the threat of terrorism has already been commonplace for decades, 
during the past ?? years it has been in a state of continual transformation. 
International terrorism is organised and intricate. The problem is exacerbated, 
among other things, by the association of terrorism with religious and other 
extremist movements as well as by technological advances that provide 
increasingly effective tools for the purpose of causing harm. The in?uence of 
extremism is projected to be on the rise. As demonstrated by the tragic events 
in ?orway in ????, terrorism or violent extremism are not always associated 
with external networks or foreign actors.
Global counter?terrorist cooperation and, especially, the E?’s counter?terrorist 
action is being further intensi?ed. This comprehensively encompasses 
cooperation in judicial and internal affairs, combating radicalisation and 
terrorist recruitment, and preventing the underlying causes of terrorism such 
as social exclusion and inequality. Target protection, tracking down terrorists 
and dealing with the aftereffects of terrorist strikes are also important topics.
International organised crime such as the traf?cking in narcotics and humans 
as well as the illicit arms trade and money laundering are growing international 
problems. Simultaneously, as the free movement of people increases more 
police and judicial cooperation are required.
Dangerous infectious diseases pose a serious international security threat. 
Combating natural or intentionally spread contagious diseases requires closer 
cooperation and preparedness among civilian and military authorities.
Signi?cant questions are also associated with border management, immigration 
control and the functioning of international civil defence cooperation.
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Conclusions
Finland is increasingly dependent on international well?being, stability 
and security and Finland’s security challenges arise from a wider 
international setting. In this respect Finland faces no speci?c or 
immediate security threats. However, unforeseeable developments in 
the operating environment and uncertainty may also cause negative 
security impacts on Finland. 
The changes in the global security environment offer, ?rst and foremost, 
economic and political prospects for Finland. However, they also 
pose challenges such as cross?border security challenges. A strong 
commitment to wide?ranging international cooperation serves Finland’s 
interests. Global interdependence also highlights the signi?cance of 
multilateral cooperation.
The increase of the E?’s in?uence serves Finland’s interests. Finland 
has an established status as an active Member of the E? and as an 
international actor. Changes in the international power balance affect 
the relative position of the E? and, hence, that of Finland.
It is important for Finland that international cooperation continue 
to build on transparency and universal values and international law. 
Finland will endeavour to strengthen them as a Member State of the 
E? and in cooperation with other democracies. It would be of great 
importance that the emerging powers increase their participation in 
solving international questions, including burden?sharing.
When it comes to global public goods Finland has actively advanced the 
strengthening of cooperation and international arrangements related to 
transboundary water resource management. In Rio???, ?? conference 
on Sustainable Development Finland promoted adoption of a global 
goal on water, which would consist of universal access to water and 
sanitation, improved water ef?ciency and water quality.
The development of international cooperation is essential with regard to 
all cross?border threats. Above all, through the E? and bilaterally Finland 
responds to challenges to comprehensive security and by taking action 
on topics such as climate and energy policy, terrorism and organised 
crime, border management and immigration control.
As an economy reliant on exports, Finland depends on, among other 
things, the international media networks and trade and transport 
networks. This is becoming increasingly important owing to technological 
advances and other economic and societal development.  Finland is one 
of the most developed information societies and its functions depend on 
various electronic networks and services therein.
The threat of international terrorism in Finland remains low. Because 
of the rising number of persons that may have terrorism?related 
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connections and the increasing threat of terrorism in its neighbouring 
areas, Finland, too, must actively monitor the threat of terrorism and 
institute preventive measures. 
1.2 Role of the key actors in the global transition 
Role of the European Union as a global actor 
The idea of strengthening and utilising interdependence, including the need 
for common rules, is an important principle of the European ?nion. Hence, it 
is only natural that the E? is one of the leading actors in many international 
cooperative structures.
The E? plays an invaluable role in strengthening the international judicial 
system, promoting the freedom and transparency of the international economy, 
and setting up and defending its rules. 
The E? has assumed, and is expected to assume, the role of responsible 
initiator in resolving global issues such as controlling climate change, 
guaranteeing sustainable development, eradicating poverty and developing 
global governance. The E?’s clout as a global actor hinges on its ability to 
ef?ciently operate within international organisations. For this reason, the E?’s 
coherence in international organisations should be strengthened. 
The E? has fallen into a severe economic crisis from which there is no fast 
way out. It is imperative to solve the crisis, revive economic growth and 
competitiveness as well as strengthen the E?’s internal cohesion and preserve 
its character as a value community. These are necessary for the ?nion to 
maintain its credibility and secure its role as a global actor and a strategic 
partner for other major actors. The ?nion’s valuable input is not limited to 
the economy, and so a decline of the ?nion would more extensively erode the 
multinational system and international cooperation.
?ther factors of uncertainty are also related to the ?nion’s future development 
and they re?ect on its global capacity. These include issues such as the growing 
pressure for differentiated integration, recent internal developments in certain 
Member States, challenges related to stabilising the European neighbourhood 
and the dif?culties the E?’s enlargement policy faces.
?otwithstanding its own crisis, the E?’s international standing faces pressures 
caused by economic, political and value?related changes in the world. The E?’s 
strong position as the world’s largest economic area has been the crux of its 
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in?uence. In the conditions of global transition the E? will continue to be a 
leading trade policy actor and an important trading partner for the other major 
actors.
A functioning transatlantic partnership between the European ?nion and the 
?nited States is crucial to the E?’s international in?uence. Economic cooperation 
between the E? and the ?nited States lays the foundation for an open and 
collaborative international economy, which must be further strengthened.
The E? continues to cooperate multilaterally, among other things, in supporting 
democracy, human rights, basic rights and liberties and gender equality, and 
in promoting the rule of law and in crisis management. At the same time the 
E? establishes collaborative networks and partnerships, especially with the 
emerging powers and regional organisations.
The strengthening of the E? as a global actor demands a more ef?cient use 
of its wide range of policy instruments in its external relations. The external 
action policy includes the common commercial policy and development policy, 
the common foreign and security policy ?CFSP? and its subset, the common 
security and defence policy ?CSDP?. In addition, the E?’s internal policies 
and their external dimension are valuable instruments in the ?nion’s global 
action, which includes environmental and climate issues and the prevention of 
international crime.
The structures created by the Lisbon Treaty increase the chances of 
strengthening the E?’s role? they also improve the consistency, coherence and 
effectiveness of its external action. ?onetheless, the goal of the external action, 
i.e. coherence between the different policies of the ?nion’s external action 
and between these and its other policies, has not materialised as planned. 
The phase of setting up the European External Action Service, including the 
evolution of its institutional culture, is still in progress.  It is a challenge for the 
High Representative to combine the plethora of roles of the of?ce.
E? Member States have lacked the political will to act more coherently and 
support the activities of the High Representative and the External Action 
Service. Predominantly the large Member States do not always act within the 
framework of the ?nion, which weakens the E?’s capacity. The Member States’ 
foreign and security policy priorities often result in E? foreign policy which is 
built on compromises based on the lowest common denominator. This weakens 
the ?nion’s capacity and decreases its clout. ?either has the CFSP been at the 
core of political decision?making in recent years.
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In order to improve the effectiveness of the CFSP the Member States should 
be able to establish a common strategic vision which de?nes the key foreign 
policy questions, common objectives and the order of importance of these. In 
the long run, provided that the E? wants to retain its capacity to respond to 
global security challenges, there is no alternative for a robust common foreign 
and security policy.
The United States shifts focus to Asia 
Despite the global change the ?nited States will retain its world leadership 
and it plays a key role in solving many global problems and in responding to 
challenges. From the standpoint of a well?functioning rules?based international 
system, it is important that the ?nited States commit to the multilateral system 
as well as to international law and cooperation.
Taking into account the geopolitical shifts, the present state of the economy, 
the lessons learned from the protracted operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
and counter?terrorist action, the ?nited States has undertaken a review of its 
security strategy. Apart from the energy sector the ?nited States, generally 
speaking, is becoming increasingly dependent on the international system. By 
the end of this decade ?orth America will be nearly self?suf?cient as regards 
fossil fuels. This may affect the manner in which the ?nited States chooses to 
emphasise its strategic interests.
Different views exist in the ?nited States concerning the future orientation 
of its foreign policy. The present administration believes in the promotion of 
partnerships and cooperation. There are also those who think the ?nited States 
should attempt to preserve its primacy in different situations by resorting to 
power politics, if necessary. Then there are those who believe that the ?nited 
States should discerningly curtail its international role, focusing resources on 
domestic issues instead.
In recent years the ?nited States has exercised its international leadership in 
a ?exible manner by creating partnerships, calling for dialogue and committing 
to multilateral cooperation. Meanwhile, the ?nited States has retained its 
military supremacy, and continues to act unilaterally when it sees ?t to do so.
The overall strategic interest of the ?nites States as well as its economic and 
military focus is shifting towards the Asia?Paci?c region. The ?SA prepares to 
maintain its geopolitical presence and security commitments with its allies in 
the region. The countries in the area hope that the ?nited States will act as a 
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counterbalance to China’s rising military power. In addition, the Greater Middle 
East has a prominent role in ?S defence planning.
The strategic shift does not imply that the ?nited States is about to abandon 
its commitments to Europe or its role as the ultimate guarantor of European 
security. The close ties between the ?nited States and Europe mean that 
the ?nited States will also continue to participate in wider European security 
cooperation. From the ?S standpoint ?AT? is the key forum for security policy 
cooperation and dialogue. The commitment and capabilities of the ?nited States 
associated with ?AT?’s collective defence arrangements remain unchanged. 
In the era of global challenges the E? and the ?nited States, being close 
strategic partners, are expected to cooperate to achieve lasting solutions. The 
?nited States believes that a cohesive E?, capable of robust global action, 
serves its interests. From the standpoint of ?S interests it is also imperative 
that the European economic crisis be resolved. To intensify the transatlantic 
partnership the ?nited States aims to persuade the European countries to 
assume a greater role in maintaining international security and in con?ict?
solution. The E? hopes that the ?nited States would increasingly commit 
to comprehensive security measures such as climate change prevention. 
The economy is at the core of the transatlantic link. This is so because the 
economies of Europe and the ?nited States are closely intertwined and the 
regions are each other’s largest trading partners, representing up to one third 
of the volume of world trade.
The global military presence of the ?nited States is built on rapidly deployable 
troops and units positioned abroad. Most western democracies ?including the 
overwhelming majority of the E? Member States? are bilateral or multilateral 
politico?military allies of the ?nited States. ?ther democracies, too, have signed 
various partnership arrangements with it. The ?nited States considers that 
democratic countries, owing to the shared value base, establish the nucleus of 
an open and collaborative international order. 
China’s global authority is on the rise 
Because of its opening economy and signi?cant economic growth China has 
become the world’s second largest economy. In a relatively short period of 
time it managed to lift hundreds of millions of people out of poverty. During 
this time China also became a major importer of raw materials and energy. 
Safeguarding the access to natural resources is a key goal of China’s foreign 
policy.
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Economic growth can be considered to be the central factor that maintains 
China’s internal stability. The differences in standards of living in China are 
great and there are a considerable number of poor people. ?ne of China’s key 
goals relates to extending the higher standards of living beyond its wealthier 
coastal areas. ?ther signi?cant challenges include the ageing population, social 
problems, issues related to human rights and freedom of speech, the progress 
of democracy as well as unsolved environmental problems. 
The mere size of China and its dynamic economy have turned it into an 
important economic actor on the global scale. China bene?ts from the western?
created, transparent and rules?based world economy.
China continues to focus on its internal problems and on raising its standard 
of living. This re?ects on its foreign policy as well. However, other countries 
want China to play a constructive international role when it comes to burden?
sharing in solving global economic and environmental problems, including 
climate change and regional crises. While it has continued to emphasise its 
development challenges, warily eyeing any new commitments, it has also 
undertaken noteworthy action in curbing its growing environmental problems.
China stresses state sovereignty as well as non?interference in states’ internal 
affairs. China has preparedness to retaliate should foreign powers criticise its 
policies on human rights or Tibet.  For China, its ?ne?China Policy is integral 
part of its foreign policy, and it concerns especially Taiwan.  ?ne?China Policy 
is widely recognised within the international community, including the E?.
China, like the other countries in the area, shows growing interest in maritime 
regions and groups of islands off the Paci?c coastline. Regarding security in 
Eastern Asia as well as global security it is important that regional and local 
disputes such as those in the South China Sea be solved through consultations. 
This should be done under international law, including the principles of 
international maritime law. The South China Sea possesses global strategic 
importance because approximately one half of the world trade passes through 
its maritime routes.
While China has no treaty?based network of allies, economic interaction 
increases its in?uence in its neighbourhood as well as in Africa and Latin 
America. The economic integration of the large economies in Eastern Asia 
increases their shared interests which, in time, may bring them closer together.
The European ?nion is an important trading partner for China. Conversely, 
China is the biggest supplier of industrial products for the ?nion. Both parties 
are increasingly interested in mutual cooperation. This being the case, both 
32
sides are committed to launching negotiations of an E??China investment 
agreement as soon as possible.
Russia’s wide-ranging interests
Russia aims to preserve its great?power status, which is built on its permanent 
membership of the ?? Security Council, its nuclear arsenal and its abundant 
reserves of energy and raw materials. Russia is an important actor in the global 
arena and in Europe, even though its in?uence varies by region and topic. 
Russia’s international standing is affected by its ability to tackle its internal 
challenges, such as an unbalanced economy, corruption which impedes 
economic and administrative reform, bleak demographic trends as well as 
shortcomings in the rule of law and the political system. 
Russia keeps promoting a multilateral world order and it wants to be duly 
recognised as a key actor in global policy. Russia underscores the principles of 
state sovereignty and non?interference. In international con?icts Russia tries 
to constrain international interventions and will not accept political change as 
the goal of any intervention. Russia’s input in global governance is uneven, for 
example in environmental and development questions. 
The focus of Russia’s foreign policy lies in the area of the former Soviet ?nion 
where it aims to preserve or increase its in?uence. A signi?cant number of 
Russians live in countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States ?CIS?. 
Russian foreign and security policy is built on the premise that the ?nited States 
and ?AT? might challenge its sphere of in?uence and great power?status. 
Russia’s military?political estimates emphasise its relationship with the ?nited 
States as well as the growing geostrategic importance of Asia, which does not 
eliminate the importance of Europe to Russia’s wider security interests.
The ?reset’ in the relationship between the ?nited States and Russia was 
pronounced in ????. The aim was to make progress in ?S?Russian relations 
on such matters in which consensus was considered achievable. The most 
important achievement is the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty ?START?, 
which entered into force in ????. Furthermore, Russia opened its territory 
to ?AT? supply routes to Afghanistan, which will be of special importance 
in the drawdown phase of ?AT?’s ISAF operation ?International Security 
Assistance Force? and the implementation of the follow?on operation. Russia 
has also participated in P????cooperation ??SA, ??, China, France, Russia 
and Germany? in the diplomatic efforts with regard to Iran’s nuclear program. 
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Russia’s long?sought membership of the World Trade ?rganization ?WT?? 
materialised in ???? with the support of the European ?nion and the ?nited 
States.
Strategic missile defence continues to be the major point of dispute in ?S?
Russian and, consequently, ?AT??Russia relations. ?o solution satisfying both 
parties has been found. Russia and ?AT? disagree in their estimates whether 
the implementation of ?AT?’s missile defence programme in its current form 
could weaken Russia’s strategic deterrence in the future, thus altering the 
balance of power. Russia’s demands of legally binding guarantees have not 
been accepted by ?AT? or the ?nited States.
Russia’s major security challenges are along its southern borders as well as 
in regions bedevilled by instability, con?ict and radicalisation related to the 
rise of Islamist extremism. Despite the abolition of martial law the ?orthern 
Caucasus, especially Dagestan, remains volatile. At times the violence spills 
over into other regions in Russia.
The rise of China is increasingly important to Russia’s security policy 
considerations. Russia considers its relationship with China to be a strategic 
partnership which is implemented bilaterally as well as multilaterally under 
the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation ?rganisation ?SC??. At the global 
stage, especially in the ?? Security Council, Russian and Chinese views often 
converge.
Russia and China are rivals. China is strengthening its economic clout in Central 
Asia. Due to the developments in Central Asia, Russia aims to strengthen the 
signi?cance and standing of the Collective Security Treaty ?rganisation ?CST??, 
which it leads, as a true actor in the region’s security architecture.
The Russian Far East is integrating into the China?led Asia?Paci?c economic 
zone. Russia is concerned about the consequences of China’s economic and 
demographic impact in the Russian Far East.
Russia promotes Eurasian economic integration which, in its ?rst phase, has 
materialised in a customs union between Russia, Belarus and ?azakhstan. 
Russia also wants the other CIS countries to join the customs union. Russia’s 
long?term vision is a more deeply integrated Eurasian ?nion modelled on the 
E?, in which the Member States pursue a common monetary and foreign 
exchange policy as well as economic policy.
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Russia and the E? are strategic partners and their mutual relationship, especially 
in the area of the economy, is extensive. The E? is Russia’s biggest trading 
partner and the most important market for its energy exports. Russia is also 
the most important energy supplier for many E? countries. The exploitation of 
shale gas in the ?nited States and the increasing trade in lique?ed natural gas 
impact Russia’s standing in the energy market. Russia often prefers to operate 
bilaterally with the largest E? countries. Russia’s WT? membership opens 
new vistas for intensi?ed trade relations and the modernisation of Russia’s 
economy. Should Russia continue to deepen its wide?ranging cooperation with 
the E? it might also better fare in its modernisation attempts. Furthermore, 
Russia’s memberships of the G?? and the G? provide in?uential frames of 
reference? they are also important to Russia for reasons of prestige. 
Russia’s development
Whereas Russia’s economy survived the ????–???? crisis with the help of 
its previously accumulated cash reserves and the recovering price of energy, 
economic growth has been much more anaemic during this decade. Russia’s 
economy continues to depend on the production and export of energy and raw 
materials. The volume of oil and gas production is not expected to signi?cantly 
increase. 
Characteristic to Russia’s political system, the concentration of power on the 
president will continue. Thus far this has been seen, among other things, in 
the role of the parliament and the relatively minor role of political parties in 
decision?making. The next federal election is scheduled for December ????. 
Changes in the political system are expected to occur at regional and local 
levels in the coming years. The reforms related to the registration of political 
parties and the direct election of governors, launched during the previous 
president’s administration, raised the citizens’ expectations of reforming the 
centralised system. Progress, however, has been sluggish. In addition to the 
democratisation process the citizens are concerned about the shortcomings in 
the rule of law as well as the widespread corruption. Many are also worried 
about the restrictions imposed on ?G?s and the media, and the implementation 
of the new legislation. 
Russia continues to struggle with its demographic situation even though the 
birth rate has risen to the average European level. During this decade the 
working?age population will diminish by approximately nine million people. 
While emigration is on the rise, fuelling Russia’s interest in protecting its citizens 
abroad, immigration is also increasing in a situation in which Russia has already 
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received more immigrants than any other country in Europe. Immigration is 
one of the underlying causes for the growing nationalism in Russia.
Problems in the democratisation process, slower economic growth and the 
continuing violence in the ?orthern Caucasus motivate people to emigrate 
from Russia. Consequently, Russian citizens comprise one of the largest groups 
of asylum?seekers in the area of the European ?nion.
Spurred by the economic growth the proportion of the middle class is growing. 
?evertheless, inequalities in income and disparities between regions remain 
large compared to those in Europe. The population and well?being are 
converging in Moscow, St Petersburg and other large cities. Peripheral areas, 
especially in the north and the east, are facing the risk of atrophy.
When it comes to Russia’s opposition groups, the western media most often 
takes notice of the actors who support liberal western values. Still, nationalists 
and communists also have a strong voice in Russia’s opposition. The 
opposition forces are not united under any conspicuous leader. The popularity 
of the different parties will be determined by the elections in the coming 
years. It will also be seen whether the opposition forces integrate into the 
conventional political party system if free political competition is considered 
to be unattainable. The goal of the most recent protest movement has been 
to achieve a society which is built on extensive participation and in?uencing, 
rather than on a top?down authoritarian system.
The United Nations and the new groupings
The central role of the ?nited ?ations in the international system is based on 
its unique status of encompassing practically all countries of the world as its 
members. In recent years the Security Council has also assumed a greater role 
in con?ict prevention and resolution, and in legitimising the use of force under 
international law, even though its composition does not properly re?ect the 
present power balance.
The ?nited ?ations will continue to remain the generally recognised forum 
for discussing and resolving global and international problems. ?o other 
organisation or alliance can replace the role of the ??. The Security Council 
has remarkably stepped up its performance since the end of the Cold War. 
?onetheless, in recent years there have been some challenges regarding 
the functioning of the Council. ?? Member States must demonstrate more 
determined common leadership and increasingly consistent commitment to 
strengthen the capacity of the organisation.
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The purpose of the ?nited ?ations is to maintain international peace and 
security. ?nder international law, the key principles for the use of force are 
included in the ?? Charter. The basic premise is that the use of force is 
prohibited except for the purpose of self?defence or under ?? Security Council 
mandate. The European ?nion, ?AT?, the African ?nion and other regional 
actors are developing their cooperation with the ??. The ?? is vitally important 
to the development of comprehensive security.
The Responsibility to Protect ?R?P or RtoP? principle, adopted by the ?nited 
?ations General Assembly in ????, rose to the centre of the international 
agenda following the events in Libya and the Ivory Coast. The situation in 
Libya in ???? was the ?rst time the Security Council issued a mandate for the 
use of force in accordance with the RtoP principle. The operation in Libya also 
generated political discord with regard to the application of the Security Council 
Resolution’s mandate. This may affect the way in which the RtoP principle will 
be applied in the future as well as the general manner by which demanding 
crisis management operations will be handled in the ?? Security Council.
When it comes to groups outside the ?? system the G??? has played an 
important role in questions related to economic and monetary policy. It has 
also shown initiative in various security?related themes such as the prevention 
of proliferation of WMDs and counter?terrorist action. 
The signi?cance of the G??, encompassing the major economic powers, has 
grown. This was particularly evident in controlling the economic crisis which 
began in ????. The G?? has managed to coordinate economic policy and 
international ?nancial supervision. Its activities have evolved from economic 
topics to other global issues such as climate policy. From the standpoint of 
multilateral cooperation the development of the relationship between the 
G?? and the ??, including its agencies, will be important. The decisions 
taken by the G?? will ultimately be implemented by states and established 
international organisations. Still, the ?? can issue global authorisations to the 
G??’s decisions. The E? participates in the activities of the G?? and the G???, 
represented by the President of the European Commission and the President 
of the European Council.
While the BRICS countries ?Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa? are 
established as a concept, the group’s approaches and goals have not become 
fully established. The BRICS countries have differing views regarding the focus 
of their activities, their role and ambitions. Russia is trying to strengthen the 
political role of the BRICS group as a part of the multilateral world order. The 
BRICS countries are not a cohesive group as regards values.
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Regional organisations are important, especially in the ?eld of trade and 
economic cooperation. Particularly the African integration organisations 
such as the African ?nion, the Economic Community of West African States 
?EC?WAS? and the Southern African Development Community ?SADC? have 
made great progress in political and security questions. They bear considerable 
responsibility over the continent’s security policy. In the Asia?Paci?c region the 
Association of Southeast Asian ?ations ?ASEA?? and the Asian Regional Forum 
?ARF? have raised their status.
Conclusions
From the Finnish standpoint the future global role of the E? will be of 
special importance. It is in Finland’s interests to advance the E?’s global 
capacity and role, and its cohesion in every possible way. 
It is important for Finland to closely monitor the great powers’ political 
and economic development and shifts in their strategic orientation. It 
is equally important that Finland develop close bilateral relations with 
them. 
It is also important that Finland develop its multilateral cooperation with 
the key international actors. The ?? provides a unique forum for the 
management of international questions. Finland’s in?uence in global 
groupings outside the ?? structure, such as in the G?? and the G???, 
will materialise through its E? membership.
A robust and well?functioning multilateral system based on cooperation 
is important to Finland. It is imperative that the ?nited States commit 
to strengthening it.
Closer economic ties between the E? and the ?SA, including the 
negotiations on a free trade agreement, would strengthen both 
economies and support the development of an international, rules?
based trade regime.
It is particularly important for Finland to assess Russia’s political 
development and the goals of its international action. Finland invests in 
its relationship with Russia both bilaterally and through its involvement 
in the E?, including support for a new E??Russia Agreement.
The importance of E? cohesion is accentuated in the E?’s external 
relations. From the Finnish standpoint cohesive action is particularly 
important in E??Russian relations.
The Finnish?Russian arctic partnership creates the framework for 
charting mutual interest, establishing contacts for handling questions 
related to comprehensive security and achieving results. Russia is also 
the most important market for Finnish arctic know?how. ?ortheast 
38
Passage cooperation has been discussed within the framework of the 
Partnership.
The ?ordic countries are the natural reference group for Finland. ?n a 
global scale Finland, like the other ?ordic countries, is one of the most 
successful and stable western democracies. The ?ordic welfare state 
model, built on a competitive economy and a high rate of employment 
as well as equal services and care, has proved to be an attractive social 
system. It is essential that Finland preserve the strengths of this model.
The Responsibility to Protect principle
The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) is a political commitment adopted by UN Member States 
in 2005. Its purpose is to protect civilians from genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and ethnic cleansing. The basic principles of the RtoP are: 1) The State carries the primary 
responsibility for protecting populations from the aforementioned crimes; 2) The international 
community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulﬁlling this responsibility; 
and 3) If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community 
must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations. While the primary means 
are intended to be peaceful, using the instruments available in Chapters VI-VIII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, should they prove insufﬁcient the Security Council can also mandate 
the use of military force for this purpose. This may entail a temporary violation of a state’s 
territorial sovereignty. Even though the RtoP principle is not a binding legal standard on states 
or individuals, it carries moral authority as a guiding principle in organisations’ multilateral 
diplomacy and crisis management, especially when it comes to the UN. 
In 2011 the UN Security Council mandated military interventions in Libya and the Ivory Coast 
with Resolutions 1973 and 1975, both of which referred to the RtoP principle.
In the autumn of 2011 Brazil made the initiative on Responsibility while Protecting. Its 
purpose is to create mechanisms that establish some ground rules for the implementation of 
RtoP and the use of military force.
In order to consolidate the RtoP concept it is important that the RtoP be actively and primarily 
implemented through peaceful means, in accordance with Chapter VI. Should these prove 
insufﬁcient, the instruments available in Chapter VII could be invoked. In addition, in the 
future the role of regional organisations in implementing the RtoP and, to a larger extent, in 
advancing human security, will continue to grow.
1.3 Military power and arms control
The changing character of war
While the threat of large?scale armed aggression has diminished, it cannot 
categorically be ruled out over the long term. Military force can also be 
employed in a limited fashion in regional and internal con?icts, and as an 
instrument of power projection. Even an extensive use of force in the future 
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will not necessarily translate into seizing and occupying large land areas. The 
adversary may attempt to achieve his goals by using force unexpectedly, and 
by rapidly seizing limited key areas. The defender’s early?warning window and 
the period available for raising readiness will shrink.
In addition to the military means, warfare will simultaneously incorporate 
different asymmetric means as well as political, economic and military 
pressure, various forms of information and cyber warfare, and combinations 
thereof. Chronologically speaking, hostilities can already begin in peacetime 
with psychological and information operations. This increasingly blurs the line 
between political pressure and warfare. ?ew technologies will not necessarily 
replace most traditional means of warfare. ?evertheless, technology will create 
new possibilities for waging war. The western countries have widely adopted a 
network?centric defence concept built on ICT technology which enhances joint 
situation awareness, rapid decision?making, joint effect and interoperability. 
The aim is to compensate for the suddenness of crises and the fog of battle by 
improving prognostication, situation awareness and the situation picture as well 
as the intelligence and analysis capacity. Particularly the use of ICT systems 
also generates signi?cant knock?on effects such as system vulnerability and 
incurred costs. 
The options for non?state actors increase with the development of dual?use 
technology and society’s growing vulnerability. It will be increasingly dif?cult to 
identify the sources of threats and perpetrators, especially in the information 
space and cyberspace. The entire society will be the target of the attack, rather 
than the armed forces alone.
The tempo of future military operations will be rapid and their progression 
will be dif?cult to predict. Troops will be increasingly mobile, possessing more 
?repower and improved range and accuracy of ?re. Critical military capabilities 
will include intelligence and surveillance systems, the capabilities of the air 
force, the navy and special forces. ?nmanned aerial vehicles will be developed 
for intelligence and surveillance and, to a growing extent, as platforms for 
precision?guided munitions.
As a result of the increasing proportion of regular military personnel in the 
armed forces the number of troops will decrease. However, the troops will be 
much more deployable in contrast to the units in conscript?based systems. 
?evertheless, defence cuts will increase the importance of the reserves. In 
addition to achieving savings niche expertise, needed in complex crises, can 
be recruited from the reserves. 
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As the nature of con?ict changes and technological options multiply 
the development of, and compliance with, international obligations and 
humanitarian law in armed con?icts require closer monitoring and attention. 
This also affects the international acceptability of weapon systems and their 
availability in the international market. The changing nature of con?ict will 
make it increasingly challenging to protect the civilian population. 
Development of armed forces 
While the threat of a global great?power con?ict remains low regional, local 
and internal con?icts pop up continually. They increasingly include non?state 
actors. Prolonged unresolved con?icts do not only cause casualties, they also 
result in civilian casualties and carry the risk of escalation. 
The end of the Cold War over two decades ago reduced defence spending 
globally. However, at the turn of the ??st Century defence appropriations 
began to climb again. Still, the current economic crisis causes outright cuts 
or lower growth in defence spending, especially in Western Europe. Contrary 
to this development, the defence budgets of Russia, Sweden, ?orway and 
Estonia – Finland’s neighbours – are on the rise.
In most European countries the development of armed forces is increasingly 
geared towards international crisis management. Western Europe has, by and 
large, abolished general conscription. ?et, on many other continents armed 
forces are still being developed with an emphasis on territorial defence and the 
capabilities for a large?scale use of force. The western countries will primarily 
carry out their territorial defence through alliance?based defence solutions. 
This means that their armed forces will have had to develop the capability 
of participating in multinational joint operations outside their own area, if 
necessary.
The ?S spending cuts aimed at reducing the increasing debt will also impact 
defence budgets during the next decade. ?wing to the end of the operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan the combined effect of the savings will probably translate 
to zero growth in defence spending. ?onetheless, the ?nited States will 
retain its overwhelming global military supremacy. The reductions will focus, 
especially on the Army as the ?nited States, in line with the ???? strategic 
guidance for the Department of Defense, will no longer maintain the ability to 
?ght two sustained large?scale wars at once, and will be cautious about future 
participation in large?scale and prolonged crisis management operations.
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In conjunction with the cuts the ?S armed forces will be developed to be 
increasingly mobile, ?exible and deployable. The strategic focus is shifting  to 
the Asia?Paci?c region. The signi?cance of global commons will grow in ?S 
strategy, aiming at guaranteeing the freedom of transport routes critical to 
trade. Additional resources will be allocated, among other things, to cyber 
defence and space?based systems as well as intelligence and missile defence. 
The ?nited States will continue to be the leading source of defence technology 
and R&D in the future as well.  
The ?nited States has increased its military predominance in relation to its 
European ?AT? Allies, especially in its ability to execute large?scale operations 
and develop and use expensive and advanced capabilities. Within the 
spheres of ?AT? burden?sharing also carries a political attribute in addition 
to the practical one. The ?nited States pays particular attention to this. The 
European allies contribute less and less to the sum total and their defence 
G?P?shares have been diminishing. The operation in Libya clearly revealed 
the shortcomings in European capabilities. Even though the operation was 
carried out under European leadership, it could not be implemented without 
?S strategic capabilities such as airlift, air?refuelling and C?I systems.
Even though the nuclear capability has dramatically lost its relative importance 
in ?S thinking in the post?Cold War era, the ?nited States intends to modernise 
its strategic arsenal in the coming decade. The ?nited States will also develop 
its conventional long?range weapons arsenal so as to enable precision?guided 
strikes.
The growth of defence spending in China and Russia, the countries with the 
next largest defence budgets after the ?nited States, continuously exceeds the 
growth of their respective national economies. From the military standpoint 
China is a regional great power which also uses regional interests as well as 
a growing need to guarantee the maritime transports and availability of raw 
materials as a backdrop to its military programme. China develops its armed 
forces in many ?elds, concentrating speci?cally on state?of?the?art capabilities. 
These include missile technology and aircraft carriers, stealth ?ghters, space 
technology and the cyber domain. China also aims to modernise and increase 
the number of its strategic warheads. 
Russia’s strategic goal is to restore an internationally recognised military great?
power status. It has launched a comprehensive weapons and equipment 
modernisation programme. According to the plans one third of state 
appropriations will be earmarked for the defence and internal security in the 
coming years. The plan is to allocate approximately E?R ??? billion alone to 
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weapons procurements by ????. The focus will be on the nuclear arsenal as 
well as air and space?based defence systems.
As per its military doctrine Russia also reserves the right to use pre?emptive 
force and defend its citizens outside its own territory. Russia will be developing 
numerically smaller, yet more deployable and modernised armed forces. The 
goal is to improve the speed, range and accuracy of capabilities and weapon 
systems. Russia, too, is developing its cyber warfare capacity.
The bulk of Russia’s armed forces are positioned in the ?orthern Caucasus and 
in strategically vital areas such as Moscow and the Far East. When necessary, 
the troops are redeployed in accordance with the centre of gravity. Troop 
transfers are an integral element of strategic exercises in Russia.
?uclear weapons in operational readiness are the essence of Russia’s strategic 
deterrence in the ????s. The pronounced role of the nuclear arsenal in Russia’s 
military doctrine will continue well into the future. ?uclear weapon systems 
have also been systematically developed through various military programmes.
?nited ?ingdom and France, the fourth and ?fth largest defence spenders, as 
well as many other European countries have cut their defence appropriations 
since the onset of the economic crisis in ????. 
The defence budgets of Russia, the United Kingdom, Germany and France from 
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Development of multinational defence cooperation
As the ?nited States is shifting its foreign and security policy focus from Europe 
to Asia, European countries are forced to assume more responsibility over their 
own security. This is the latest step in the process which began as soon as the 
Cold War ended. ?evertheless, it is impossible to increase the responsibility 
and role of Europe without closer defence cooperation. As appropriations 
continue to diminish countries are less able to independently generate all of 
the required military capabilities. A completely independent national defence 
is no longer a viable concept. Collaborative capability development as well as 
pooling and sharing have become important political and military goals. 
The challenges also impact the ?eld of defence materiel. In addition to the 
common security and defence policy the European ?nion seeks solutions by 
developing the single market. 
Participation in this cooperation is voluntary and countries make case?by?case 
decisions regarding the projects and their input.  Actual projects are launched 
at the behest of willing partners in different country groupings. The European 
?nion and ?AT? coordinate and facilitate said cooperation. Whereas the ?nion 
calls this approach ?Pooling & Sharing’, ?AT? calls it ?Smart Defence’. As a 
Member State of the E? and a ?AT? partner Finland participates in both of 
them. Consequently, defence cooperation does not imply military alliance 
or any changes in Finland’s fundamental security policy solutions.  ?ordic 
Defence Cooperation ???RDEFC?? is an example of a well?functioning regional 
collaborative arrangement.
In practice, cooperation can cover various functions, ranging from 
training, exercises and capability development to common operations. The 
interdependence arising from various joint projects advances the commitment 
of participants and promotes the access to capabilities when needed.
The advantages of cooperation should not only be evaluated from the standpoint 
of short?term results and cost?savings. To a large extent cooperative ventures 
are only at an early stage, and states have differing views and expectations 
regarding the terms and goals of cooperation. Moreover, divergent defence 
solutions, dissimilar legislation and practices as well as industrial policy factors 
impact the content and scheduling of cooperation. 
Pooling and sharing projects have already created tangible results. An example 
of a well?functioning joint project involves the Strategic Airlift Capability 
cooperation, in which twelve countries, Finland and Sweden included, share 
acquisition and operating costs for three strategic C??? transport aircraft. A 
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speci?c challenge in the future concerns the sharing of capabilities in which 
a country will rely on the capabilities of another country or other countries. 
Emphasis on national sovereignty and uncertainty over access to shared 
capabilities in the hour of need are challenges to such cooperation. This applies 
to allied and non?allied states alike. When it comes to, especially, non?allied 
countries, the abolishment of critical defence capabilities would require the 
creation of binding agreements. 
Training and exercises of troops and units is an integral part of capability 
development. In recent years combined joint interoperability has been 
maintained and developed, especially in ?peration ISAF in Afghanistan. 
It will be important to maintain the level of interoperability and guarantee 
the dissemination of the lessons?learned. The level of performance and 
interoperability needed in multinational operations, as per international 
standards and practices, can only be attained by regularly participating in 
demanding multinational training and exercises. 
The signi?cance of, in particular, multinational response forces, such as the 
E? Battle Groups ?E?BG? and the ?AT? Response Force ??RF?, will become 
increasingly important in the coming years as vehicles for the development 
of interoperability and armed forces transformation. Response forces pools 
represent the pinnacle of multinational capabilities, and their practices and 
training as well as evaluation and certi?cation methods are constantly being 
updated in accordance with future challenges and the lessons?learned from 
operations. This also has real meaning regarding the composition of the units 
deployed to future crisis management operations.
The E? battle groups are relatively small units, comprising ? ??? ? ? ??? 
troops. The E? has two battle groups on a standby period of ? months, ready 
for deployment. The E?BG can be used independently or as a part of a larger 
crisis management operation. The battle groups facilitate a rapid E? military 
response to a crisis. They must be able to start implementing the operation 
on the ground within ten days of unanimous approval from the Council. Their 
tasks include con?ict prevention, separation of parties by force , humanitarian 
and rescue tasks, post?con?ict stabilisation, and military advice and assistance 
tasks. Even though the E?’s battle groups are yet to be deployed, the 
implementation of the Battlegroup Concept has markedly intensi?ed European 
cooperation at the practical level, and improved the interoperability of troops. 
The ?AT? Response Force ??RF? comprises an operational command and 
control element, the Immediate Response Force ?IRF? and the so?called 
Response Forces Pool ?RFP?. The command and control element and the IRF 
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must be able to deploy within ???? days of a decision. Troops in the RFP can 
supplement the IRF when necessary. ?nits in the RFP must be deployable 
within ????? days. Whilst they are not tied to any standby rosters they can 
participate in the standby troops’ training and exercises. Should the ?AT? 
Response Force be deployed to an operation, the Response Forces Pool would 
mainly supplement any shortcomings in the Immediate Response Force’s 
capabilities. 
The participation of ?AT? partners in the activities of the ?RF is always 
supplementary in nature. The partner country can independently determine its 
unit’s readiness to deploy ?????? days?. Partner participation in ?RF activities 
does not signify any commitment to potential operations. Rather, any possible 
deployment to an operation always requires a separate national decision. 
E?BG cooperation and ?AT?’s ?RF activities are mutually reinforcing: they 
develop the very same troops and capabilities and utilise ?AT? standards, 
exercises, evaluation and certi?cation processes. For their part they also 
support the goals of ?? crisis management. After all, the ?? wishes that 
regional organisations, especially the E? and ?AT?, develop rapid response 
capabilities. 
The European ?nion, ?AT?, bilateral and regional collaborative arrangements 
?incl. ??RDEFC?? are not rivals as regards capability development. ?verlapping 
participation ensures the elimination of unnecessary duplication, and that said 
collaborative venues complement each other. 
Multinational capability development cooperation: 
EU’s Pooling & Sharing and NATO’s Smart Defence
European states, irrespective of their defence solutions, are increasingly dependent on 
multinational defence cooperation when it comes to maintaining, developing and using 
military capabilities. The EU and NATO set the framework for said cooperation. Practical 
cooperation on individual capabilities often occurs in smaller country groupings under the 
tutelage of EU or NATO, in country groupings (including regional groupings) or bilaterally. The 
collaborative fora do not compete with each other, rather, they are mutually reinforcing. More 
often than not it is easier to cooperate at the practical level in smaller country groupings. 
The Member States of the EU and NATO have a long tradition of cooperation in the 
maintenance, development and use of capabilities. The economic crisis and the attempts 
of the Europeans to assume more responsibility over their own security have spurred the 
intensiﬁcation of cooperation. For their part, these factors have lifted the cooperation from 
the technical level onto the political agenda as well. Whereas the EU calls this cooperation 
‘Pooling and Sharing’ (P&S), in NATO it is known as ‘Smart Defence’.
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A German-Swedish initiative launched the EU’s P&S cooperation in 2010. The goal at the 
political level is to advance Member States’ commitment to cooperation and to set strategic 
targets for the activity. Actual cooperation occurs under the guidance of the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) within various capability projects. The EDA has fourteen priority projects (such 
as the joint maritime situation picture project and helicopter pilot training) in which willing 
Member States can participate. The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is focused on determining 
what kind of training and exercises the Member States could implement. As regards training 
and exercises, the EUMC has prioritised 12 cooperation areas (such as CBRN and special 
forces training). The development of Arctic expertise is one potential area of cooperation.
In practice, NATO focuses on multinational projects. In 2011 NATO’s Allied Command 
Transformation (ACT) prepared a major report which identiﬁed over 200 potential areas of 
cooperation. Smart Defence projects are prioritised on three tiers, in accordance with their 
schedule for potential progress. The so-called Tier 1 projects are the ones that are ready for 
implementation, i.e. they have a lead nation and assigned participants. There are more than 
20 Tier 1 projects that have been included in the Defence Package adopted by the Chicago 
Summit. As the work progresses, new proposals will be designated as Smart Defence Tier 1 
projects.
Ongoing long-term key areas include Joint Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance 
(JISR), missile defence and Baltic air policing. As regards intelligence and surveillance, last 
spring 14 Allies decided to participate in a joint procurement project of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs), which signiﬁcantly supports the creation of the Alliance Ground Surveillance 
(AGS) system. Examples of Smart Defence Tier 1 projects include the multilateralisation of 
Germany’s Joint Force Headquarters in Ulm and the offering of its services to the EU and 
NATO, and a project to pool maritime patrol aircraft. As applicable, the multilateral projects 
are open to NATO partners on a case-by-case basis. In practice the partner countries can join 
in, pending an invitation from the lead nation. 
NATO countries are committed to developing their troops towards the goal of ‘NATO Forces 
2020’. Future troops must be smaller, more agile and more ﬂexible, and technologically 
advanced. Capabilities alone do not sufﬁce, rather, interoperability must be ensured. 
The Connected Forces Initiative (CFI) complements Smart Defence. It aims to improve 
interoperability, among other things, by intensifying training and exercises. NATO partners, 
too, can participate in the CFI initiative.
Weapons of mass destruction and arms control
While a Cold War?style confrontation between the nuclear powers has vanished, 
the proliferation of ?ssile material and nuclear weapons continues to be a 
serious global threat. The fact that the parties to certain regional con?icts 
possess nuclear weapons increases the tension. For the nuclear powers, their 
nuclear arsenals are the essence of their defence strategies and great?power 
status.
The ?nited States, Russia, France, the ?nited ?ingdom and China are nuclear 
powers recognised by the Treaty on the ?on?Proliferation of ?uclear Weapons 
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??PT?. India and Pakistan, choosing to remain outside the treaty as well as 
?orth ?orea which withdrew from the ?PT also possess nuclear weapons. 
In addition, Israel, a non?party to the treaty, is generally believed to hold a 
nuclear arsenal. 
According to estimates Iran is further developing its capacity and facilities to 
the extent that it can acquire a nuclear weapons capability if it chooses to 
do so. In addition to intelligence estimates the reports of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency ?IAEA? point towards this. For a long time already the 
international community has tried to resolve the situation through negotiations 
and by imposing sanctions on Iran. ?n top of the sanctions of the ?? Security 
Council the E? and ?SA, among others, have imposed autonomous sanctions 
on it. The international community is particularly worried about the possibility 
of a unilateral strike as an attempted solution to the problem, and that several 
other countries in the region might want to follow Iran’s example should it 
succeed in acquiring a nuclear capability. Iran must be able to address the 
international community’s justi?ed concerns over its ultimate intentions.
Despite continuing efforts ?orth ?orea has refused to abolish its nuclear 
weapons programme or limit any related research and development. The 
growth of internal instability in Pakistan increases concern over the control of 
its nuclear arsenal.
The goal of a nuclear weapon?free world has increasingly entered the 
international agenda in recent years. The new START treaty between the 
?nited States and Russia is a major achievement. Then again, no negotiations 
have been conducted over the reduction of Russia’s and ?AT?’s tactical nuclear 
weapons in Europe. 
In ????, the European ?nion adopted a strategy against the proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, which includes the commitment to a multilateralist 
approach to non?proliferation and disarmament.
The ?PT regulates the non?proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
disarmament as well as the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Despite serious 
challenges to the treaty it is of central importance. The treaty has failed to 
prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers and the established nuclear 
powers have not been ready to effectively advance nuclear disarmament. 
Military R&D has been conducted under the guise of peaceful use of nuclear 
energy. The efforts on the universalisation of the ?PT continue.
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The decision to convene a conference on the establishment of a Middle East 
zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction was 
made at the ???? Review Conference of the ?PT. The international community 
authorised Finland to facilitate the conference. 
Biological threats, including biological weapons, constitute one of the greatest 
global security threats. The dual?use nature of biological agents as well as rapid 
scienti?c and technological progress pose challenges to the non?proliferation 
of these threats. Many countries’ civilian and military authorities have begun 
to invest in the prevention of bio?threats. Cooperation between national and 
international health and security authorities is imperative to prevent these 
threats. 
Chemical weapons, perceived as a more traditional problem, will also remain 
a threat. The authorities must also prepare for new types of challenges and 
threats, such as incapacitating chemical agents, in addition to existing agents 
and weapons.
Further efforts to strengthen the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention 
and the Chemical Weapons Convention ?CWC? and to widen the base of their 
signatories will continue. The total ban of these weapons is based on widely 
rati?ed agreements and customary international law requires more robust 
treaty monitoring mechanisms as well as frank international dialogue and 
exchange of information so as to guarantee the timeliness and coverage of 
norms alongside technological progress.
A growing concern is nuclear weapons or dangerous materials related to WMDs 
ending up in the hands of new states or non?state actors. Helping fragile states 
comply with their international obligations and engaging in cooperation related 
to the control of transporting dangerous materials is useful when it comes to 
nuclear non?proliferation and preventing the spread of other WMDs. 
As with the non?proliferation of WMDs, disarmament and arms control also 
continue with regard to conventional weapons so as to preserve existing 
achievements and to take on new obligations, both globally and regionally. The 
progress is slow and, in spite of the efforts, it is possible that some standards 
may weaken.
Comprehensive regulation of the international arms trade, the ambition of the 
Arms Trade Treaty ?ATT? yet to be ?nalised, is an important new goal. The illicit 
spread of small arms and shortcomings in the regulation of arms trade are 
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signi?cant problems. Whereas their effects are most apparent in developing 
countries, they also manifest themselves globally.
Arms control standards are becoming increasingly robust and the development 
echoes the strong in?uence of the ?G?s. Examples of this include the 
implementation and regional expansion of the ?ttawa Convention banning 
anti?personnel landmines as well as the ?slo Convention regarding the 
regulation of cluster munitions. The fact that many major military powers are 
not planning to accede to these treaties is a continuing problem.
International export control arrangements on conventional weapons and dual?
use technology, nuclear technology as well as the transfer of technology and 
know?how related to biological and chemical weapons are elemental features 
of the arms control regime. The arrangements maintained by the producing 
and supplying states are based on a political understanding. An internationally 
controversial decision from the recent past involves the fact that the nuclear 
technology?producing countries consented to allowing cooperation with India, 
despite it being a non?party to the ?PT.
Conclusions
Finland estimates that the prerequisites and usefulness of traditional power 
politics have decreased in the present environment of interdependence. 
However, power politics cannot be categorically ruled out, but rather 
must be prepared for. It is increasingly important to prevent and solve 
regional, local and internal con?icts through international cooperation. 
While the threat of large?scale armed aggression has diminished, military 
force can still be employed in a limited fashion in regional and internal 
con?icts, and as an instrument of power projection. Simultaneously, 
the options for non?state actors are multiplying due to advances in 
technology, and through the progressively more vulnerable societies.
Future military operations will be increasingly mobile and unpredictable, 
and the range and accuracy of ?re will improve. In addition to traditional 
military action, operations will incorporate different asymmetric means 
such as various forms of information and cyber warfare as well as 
political, economic and military pressure, and combinations thereof. 
This will be taken into consideration in the development and use of the 
defence capability. 
Finland considers the development of a multilateral international 
capability cooperation to be essential. Finland participates in capability 
cooperation on complementary fora, such as ??RDEFC?, the E? and 
?AT? partnership, and through bilateral arrangements. Comprehensive 
participation in multilateral cooperation ensures Finland’s in?uence in 
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decisions that are taken on new ?elds of cooperation, procedures and 
structures. 
Since ???? Finland has participated four times in the E? battle groups’ 
standby periods, and continues to participate in E? battle group 
cooperation.
Since ???? Finland has participated in activities supplementing the 
?AT? Response Force, and in exercises. In addition, since ???? Finland 
has regularly designated units in the Response Forces Pool ?RFP? from 
its military crisis management troop register. In ???? Finland assigned 
a Deployable CBR? Laboratory to the RFP. In ???? the contribution to 
the pool will include an army Special ?perations Task Group, followed by 
an air force F??? ?ghter squadron in ????, and a navy Amphibious Task 
?nit in ????. The units will be assigned to the pool in accordance with 
the defence establishment’s plan. 
From the Finnish perspective the intensifying European defence materiel 
cooperation is useful. The development of the E?’s single market defence 
materiel sector has been a natural development in the increasingly 
competitive international marketplace.
Advancing all sectors of the ?PT and the non?proliferation of WMDs, 
requires a strong commitment and robust collaborative arrangements 
from the international community.
The nuclear arsenals of key nuclear powers (the numbers are estimates)*
Country
Active  
warheads
Other  
warheads Total
Year of ﬁrst 
nuclear test
United States 2 150 6 350 8 500 1945
Russia 4 650 7 350 12 000 1949
United Kingdom 225  225 1952
France 288  288 1960
China 240  240 1964
India 90  90 1974
Pakistan  100 100 1998
Total 7 643 13 800 21 443  
Sources: Bureau of Arms Control, Veriﬁcation and Compliance, Department of State
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nuclear Notebook.
*The table does not include estimates on Israel or North Korea.
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The EU arms trade rules and the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty  
negotiations
The exports of military technology and equipment of the EU’s Member States is governed by 
Council Common Position 2008/944/CFSP. The EU’s new defence products related directive 
2009/43/EC simpliﬁes the transfers of defence-related products within the European 
Economic Area (EEA). However, exports to third countries remain the comprehensive foreign 
and security policy purview of each EEA Member State. Finland’s new Act on the Export 
of Defence Materiel (282/2012) requires that the Council Common Position be taken into 
consideration when the decision is being made. According to these requirements, for example 
an export licence is to be denied if the target country’s human rights situation does not 
support granting a licence or if there is a danger of the weapons ending up in the hands of 
the wrong end user, or in the illicit arms trade.
At present only a little over 25 per cent of the UN Member States have developed and 
implemented legal criteria for their international arms trade. Nor is the global arms trade 
sufﬁciently transparent. Moreover, the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons 
(SALW) causes enormous problems all over the world.
In order to rectify the situation the UN has attempted to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty for 
the purpose of governing the international trade in conventional weapons. The Treaty aims to 
establish universal and legally binding criteria for the international arms trade. The process of 
the Treaty was launched in 2006 with a UN General Assembly Resolution. Finland was one of 
the seven co-authors of the proposal; the others were Australia, Argentina, Costa Rica, Japan, 
Kenya and the United Kingdom.
The United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty was organised in July 2012. However, 
the Conference could not reach agreement on the Treaty text. Nonetheless, the draft Treaty 
presented by the President of the Conference received broad support. The major exporting 
countries, such as the United States, Russia and India, requested more time to study the draft 
treaty. Finland was prepared to accept the draft Treaty as a compromise.
The Member States will convene another conference in March 2013, using the draft Treaty 
text of the July Conference as a basis for negotiations. It is envisaged that the next conference, 
too, will operate under the principle of consensus. The EU countries, Finland included, have 
actively supported the conclusion of an Arms Trade Treaty which is as comprehensive as 
possible and legally binding.
1.4 International crisis management
Crisis management actors
Crises are often complex with regard to their origin and appearance. Their 
comprehensive management requires a continuum of various measures, 
ranging from crisis prevention, mediation and conciliation to possible military 
stabilisation and the transfer of ownership to local actors, and to the creation 
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of prerequisites for continuous development by means of civilian crisis 
management and development policy. 
The ?nited ?ations has a central role in mandating international crisis 
management operations. A ?? mandate is also emphasised when decisions 
are taken on E? and ?AT??led crisis management operations.
?nited ?ations?led crisis management, known as peacekeeping in ?? 
terminology, has increased and has been particularly focused in Africa. The 
signi?cance of the African ?nion and other regional organisations on the 
continent has risen in the management of crises in Africa. The input of the 
Arab League was politically crucial in launching the ???mandated operation 
in Libya. Also the emerging powers, India, South Africa, Indonesia, Brazil and 
China, have increased their participation in ?? crisis management operations, 
albeit choosing to abstain from a leading political role. 
???led crisis management is comprehensively being developed. It combines 
military and police activities with wide?ranging civilian action. The ?? Security 
Council also increasingly deals with the position of women in con?icts and in 
con?ict resolution, questions related to the protection of children, and civilians 
in general as well as issues related to the rule of law as part of the attempts to 
resolve armed con?icts. ?? action also exhibits the determination to increase 
the responsibility of regional and other international organisations. This is 
accentuated in extremely demanding crisis management operations. 
As part of its common security and defence policy the E? has demonstrated 
the capacity to independently carry out civilian and military crisis management 
operations, for example in the Western Balkans, the Horn of Africa and 
Afghanistan. The E? is a pioneer in civilian crisis management, especially, 
and focuses on police activities and on strengthening the rule of law and 
civilian governance. These days the E?’s military crisis management also 
covers military training. The E?’s comprehensive approach aims to utilise 
development and trade policies, humanitarian assistance, political dialogue 
and crisis management in the E?’s action so that the policy areas are mutually 
reinforcing. The goal of this approach is to improve the effectiveness of E? 
action. ?et another goal of crisis management is to develop civil?military 
cooperation and the synergies therein. 
The E? continues to develop crisis management cooperation with third 
countries. For example, the E? and the ?nited States have signed a framework 
agreement under which American civilian personnel can participate in E? 
crisis management operations. Due to the lack of progress in the negotiations 
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for a framework agreement, Russian participation in E? crisis management 
cooperation has hitherto been based on ad hoc arrangements.
The expectations on European leadership and overall responsibility in military 
crisis management continue to mount. Simultaneously the importance 
of European capability cooperation grows. ?AT? standards, criteria and 
regulations are of central importance in military crisis management. Moreover, 
the E? and ?AT? have agreed in principle that the E? can make use of ?AT?’s 
strategic capabilities in its military crisis management operations. However, the 
unresolved question regarding Cyprus hampers E???AT? security and defence 
policy cooperation as well as practical collaboration.
???mandated international crisis management operations have become one 
of ?AT?’s main tasks. As demonstrated by the operations in Afghanistan, the 
Western Balkans and Libya, ?AT? can broadly in?uence international politics 
through crisis management operations. Due to its resources and capacity ?AT? 
is the most important actor in implementing demanding crisis management 
operations. ?AT? is also developing a limited pool of civilian crisis management 
experts for the purpose of improving its cooperation capability with other 
actors in crisis management.
The ?rganization for Security and Co?operation in Europe ??SCE? plays a 
particular role in con?ict prevention. Its ?eld operations have added special 
value to the work of the organisation. 
Crisis management environments
The new crisis management environments are often more demanding than 
those of the past. The use of asymmetric means such as terrorism, sabotage 
and information warfare is on the rise, which makes it more dif?cult for the 
international community to stabilise con?ict areas. This has been demonstrated 
in Afghanistan and Somalia. The effectiveness of international action demands 
increasing coordination, consistency and perseverance, and a comprehensive 
approach.
Crisis management participation is a vehicle for international burden?sharing, 
raising international clout and improving competence. Participation in 
international burden?sharing strengthens the prospects of receiving assistance 
in a crisis. 
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Crisis management tasks are becoming all the more demanding and expensive. 
When decisions are taken with regard to participation, the fact that risks against 
personnel in crisis management tasks have risen must be taken into account.
Military crisis management operations call for versatile capabilities which are 
technologically advanced, ?exible and interoperable. Rapid deployability is 
nowadays of the essence in crisis response, and its demands must increasingly 
be taken into account. Military budget cuts and structural changes require 
the proper allocation of resources and comprehensive planning in crisis 
management, as well.
Likewise, the development of capabilities and adequate resources are topical 
questions in civilian crisis management. It is a speci?c challenge to second 
professional civilian crisis management experts from various ?elds to a crisis 
area on short notice while taking into account the region’s speci?c demands. 
As operating environments are becoming more and more demanding, the 
requirements for civilian crisis management capabilities are also growing with 
regard to training, recruitment, personal kit and logistics. The role of private 
security and defence contractors in the different phases of con?icts and post?
con?ict reconstruction is on the rise. This creates new types of problems. 
Finland, like many other states, is politically committed to the so?called 
Montreux Document, which deals with the responsibilities of states and good 
practices in ensuring compliance with humanitarian law and human rights law 
in the activities of private military and security companies. 
Conclusions
Wide?ranging participation in international crisis management ???, E?, 
?AT? and the ?SCE? is a central element of Finland’s foreign, security 
and defence policy. A ?? mandate, comprehensiveness and the mutual 
complementariness of civilian and military action have had a central 
position in Finland’s crisis management activities.
The development of the European ?nion’s crisis management 
strengthens its credibility as a global actor. Through its wide range of 
instruments the E? provides added value, and its potential synergies 
should be developed and fully exploited in crisis areas.
Finland develops its crisis management capabilities by participating in 
multinational training and exercises organised by the E?, ?AT? and its 
Member States and partners. The topics can also include emergency 
and disaster?related exercises or decision?making and consultation 
exercises.
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2 Europe’s security development and the key actors
2.1 Overall development of Europe’s security
Even though the security situation in Europe is generally stable, instability 
factors do exist in its neighbourhood, in Europe’s different regions and inside 
the E?. The European ?nion has made a crucial difference in spreading the 
zone of democracy and the increasingly wealthy free market in Europe. The 
expanding commitment to the rule of law and the respect for democracy 
and human rights has increased European unity and bolstered its economic, 
societal and security development.
The prospect of E? enlargement has visibly spurred on economic, social and 
political reforms in countries seeking E? membership. E? enlargement has 
functioned as a peace project in the Western Balkans. Following Croatia’s 
accession to the E? in ???? the enlargement process will continue elsewhere 
in the Western Balkans as well as with Iceland and Turkey. The E?’s appeal can 
justi?ably be expected to positively impact its neighbourhood, irrespective of 
the membership prospects of the countries located in its neighbourhood. This 
entails the preservation of the political will to offer E? membership to countries 
meeting the required criteria, and to further deepen relations in the European 
neighbourhood.
The European ?eighbourhood Policy ?E?P? and the Eastern Partnership aim 
to increase stability in the neighbourhood of the ?nion. The E?P provides 
for versatile relationships and offers new possibilities for in?uencing the 
development of many regions.
As a result of developments in the security environment ?AT? is increasingly 
focused on functioning as a wide?ranging security organisation that engages 
in crisis management activities. ?AT? sustains and promotes security and 
stability in Europe. ?AT? continues to keep its doors open to new members 
and, in the coming years, the focus of the accession process will be focused in 
the Western Balkans. The accession process of Georgia is unlikely to proceed 
quickly, even though Georgia retains membership prospects. The present 
government of ?kraine is not seeking membership in ?AT?.
Russia’s views affect the development of European security. Preserving its 
in?uence in its neighbourhood is an essential element of its great?power status, 
which is also echoed in E??Russian and ?AT??Russia relationships. Even though 
the ?SCE continues to provide the opportunities for the creation of a pan?
European security community, no signi?cant steps have recently been taken. 
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Conclusions
It is in Finland’s interests to support European and transatlantic security 
cooperation, especially within the framework of the E? and the ?SCE, 
and in cooperation with ?AT?. ?S commitment to European security 
and stability advances the security of the entire continent.
The societal and political development and the well?being of the ?nion’s 
neighbourhood are important for European security? the ?nion’s wide 
and extensive collaborative networks bolster this development.
2.2 The present state of the European Union and its inﬂuence  
 in its neighbourhood 
The role of the European ?nion as the model of prosperity and societal stability 
as well as being the promoter of the continent’s security and uni?cation 
processes is central. However, the global ?nancial crisis has turned into a 
protracted European recession. The economic crisis saps the ?nion’s cohesion 
and weakens its credibility as a leading actor.
The politically painful austerity measures have also encountered resistance and 
in?uenced public opinion. The essence of the ?nion as a historical uni?cation, 
peace and stability process in Europe has become blurred in the eyes of many 
citizens. The economic crisis has created unnecessary political division within 
the E?.
Economic growth, competitiveness, employment, a robust public economy and 
social well?being establish the foundation for the abovementioned issues. They 
are increasingly important security policy questions, de?ning the international 
capacity and the standing of the Member States and the ?nion.
Through the Lisbon Treaty progress has been made on the common security 
and defence policy. E? crisis management operations have a central role. In 
addition, political commitment to the development of capability cooperation 
has increased. ?evertheless, the ?nion is not developing any features leading 
towards a collective defence. The solidarity clause and the mutual assistance 
clause included in the Treaty of Lisbon strengthen the character of the ?nion 
as a security community. While there has been some discussion regarding the 
implementation of the solidarity clause, the Member States have not discussed 
the manner in which the mutual assistance obligation would be implemented. 
Regarding this, the international obligations on the non?forti?cation and 
neutralisation of the Åland Islands are also taken into account in Finland. 
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The eastern and southern neighbourhood is the focal area of the ?nion’s 
external relations where the E? widely applies its political, economic and 
development policy instruments. The European ?eighbourhood Policy also 
strengthens Europe’s security. This involves regions possessing global strategic 
importance such as the Middle East and ?orthern Africa. The European ?nion 
and the countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean as well as Eastern 
Europe and the Southern Caucasus have wide?ranging partnerships.
Even though the transition in the countries of the southern rim of the 
Mediterranean spawned from internal factors, rather than at the behest of 
the E?, the values represented by the ?nion have been at the heart of the 
evolution. The ?nion continues to play a central role in supporting the region’s 
societies as they develop their economic, social and political structures.
The E?’s southern neighbours are in a period of profound transition, which 
may entail  long?lasting effects. The democracy movements in ?orthern Africa 
and the Middle East may cause a long period of uncertainty and instability. The 
democratisation processes vary from country to country and concurrently the 
power relations in the region are undergoing a massive transformation. The 
relative weakening of the in?uence of the ?nited States in the area has already 
resulted in increasing rivalry between the states in the region. 
The forms and results of the democratisation process spawned by the Arab 
Spring vary. The role of political Islam is on the rise, exposing its many facets. 
The rivalry between moderates and radicals may intensify and could result in 
a reversion of civil liberties and women’s rights.
The stalled peace process between Israel and the Palestinians diminishes the 
prospects of implementing the two?state model, increasing the possibilities 
of renewed armed con?ict. The recent changes in the Arab World introduce 
additional tension to Arab?Israeli relations. The con?ict in Syria and the 
questions related to Iran’s nuclear programme increase the volatility of the 
region. Active involvement is expected of the E? in preventing the escalation 
of the con?icts and in resolving them.
In addition to the onward march of democracy the E?’s key strategic interests 
served by an effective southern neighbourhood policy include energy security, 
controlled immigration, the development of economic cooperation and the 
freedom of trade routes. The operations of the European border management 
agency FR??TE? on the external borders of the E? and in third countries do 
not only support the ?nion’s border control, they also bolster third countries’ 
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border management structures and national capacities, and the materialisation 
of human rights and the rule of law.
Permanent goals of the Eastern Partnership, implemented within the framework 
of the European ?eighbourhood Policy, include the consolidation of democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law as well as economic growth and well?being. 
The intensity of the E?’s relations with the countries of Eastern Europe, the 
Southern Caucasus and Central Asia varies. ?f the partner countries, Moldova, 
Georgia and ?kraine have made the most progress in coming closer to the 
European ?nion. The ?nion’s strategic goal is to not only strengthen security 
and stability in wider Europe but beyond its immediate neighbourhood as well. 
The E??Russian relationship is important to both parties. ?kraine is presently 
seeking a course at the crossroads between the E?’s and Russia’s economic 
and political sphere of in?uence. ?kraine can play an important role in the 
entire domain of the ?SCE, provided it manages to stabilise its political system 
on the foundation of democracy and the rule of law. Recently this progress has 
been somewhat erratic.
The E? strives for the democratisation of the political system of Belarus through 
the combination of dialogue, support for the civil society and sanctions. It is 
important to make Belarus conform to European standards, to which it has 
already committed in the ?SCE. 
Regional con?icts hold back political stability and democracy in the Southern 
Caucasus. This instability also has a spillover effect in Russia’s ?orthern 
Caucasus. 
Conclusion 
Finland has consistently supported European integration and the 
establishment of an extensive security community in Europe. It is 
important for Finland that the ?nion retain its status in preserving 
stability in Europe and its signi?cance as a security community. The 
development of the common security and defence policy supports the 
aforementioned goal. E? enlargement and the European ?eighbourhood 
Policy are also key factors in this development.
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2.3 The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
NATO’s internal development
?AT?’s Strategic Concept, reformed in ????, de?nes the following three core 
tasks for the Alliance: collective defence, international crisis management 
and cooperative security through partnership with relevant countries and 
international organisations.
While the threat of a conventional attack against ?AT? is considered to be 
low and the strategic concept highlights that the Alliance does not consider 
any country to be its adversary, ?AT? prepares for its collective defence 
commitment set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.
?AT? defence planning is in constant ?ux. The post?Cold War reductions in 
heavy weaponry are continuing in Europe with the focus on developing rapidly 
deployable, multi?purpose capabilities.
The ?S tactical nuclear weapons situated in Europe will be preserved, even 
though they are not generally believed to have much military signi?cance, and 
the Alliance is ready to negotiate reciprocal reductions with Russia. Progress 
on the matter has not been made because as a precondition to negotiations 
Russia demands that the ?SA withdraw to its national territory the tactical 
nuclear weapons. While the ?nited States is reducing the footprint of its 
permanently stationed troops in Europe, it is increasing its contribution to joint 
training and exercises.
?AT? adopted a Phased Adaptive Approach to defend its European allies 
against a potential ballistic missile attack by ????. The mainstay of ?S 
presence in Europe will be the missile?defence architecture which will include 
missile defence?capable warships in nearby waters as well as ground?based 
radars and missile defence interceptor sites positioned in the territories of its 
allies ?Turkey, Romania and Poland?. The system, which is primarily intended 
to defend against ?Iranian? medium?range missiles, is planned to be ready by 
???? as per the four?phase plan. It will implement the collective defence task 
pursuant to Article 5. Phase ?ne reached interim capability in ????.
In addition to international security development, the strategic refocusing 
of the ?nited States to the Asia?Paci?c raises expectations on the European 
?AT? Members as regards the implementation of ?AT?’s  tasks. The goal 
of the ?nited States is to increase the relative share of Europeans in ?AT??
led operations. Such development only increases the need to improve the 
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relationship between ?AT? and the E? in crisis management and capabilities. 
?AT?’s civil emergency preparedness activities bolster national preparedness 
and harmonise resources in view of potential crises.
In the prevailing security environment, alongside crisis management, ?AT? 
focuses on cyber security, the threat arising from the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and energy security and counter?
terrorist action. 
Reform of NATO’s partnership policy
The importance of partner countries in ?AT? activities has grown. ?AT? allies 
and partners form a wide?ranging security cooperation network. The partner 
countries signi?cantly contribute to crisis management and other security 
collaboration.
The reform of ?AT? Partnership policy, adopted in the Berlin ???? meeting 
of ministers of foreign affairs, put all ?? partner countries on equal footing 
and ended the special status of the countries participating in ?AT?’s PfP 
programme. ?AT? has improved the in?uence of its partner countries and is 
aiming to increase the options of engaging in political dialogue with them in 
different con?gurations. At the same time the fundamental distinction between 
membership and partnership will prevail, in other words, only ?AT? Member 
States will participate in collective defence and decision?making.
The ?nited States hopes that ?AT?’s partnership and cooperation develops 
in a manner through which it can accrue more bene?ts from burden?sharing. 
While ?AT? partnership arrangements are tailored to ?t the capabilities and 
readiness of its partner countries, ?AT? expects ever?increasing initiative from 
its partner countries as regards their degree of collaboration. Finland and 
Sweden are respected as partner countries that have progressed the most in 
interoperability and have actively participated in operations.
?AT? is increasingly shifting its attention beyond the Euro?Atlantic area, 
and is focusing on developing global partnerships. The ?nited States has 
underscored the role of ?AT? as the nucleus of global security and stability. 
?AT? partnership is one way to highlight interdependence and common 
responsibility with countries such as Australia, ?ew ?ealand, ?apan and South 
?orea. ?AT? is also interested in future dialogue with increasingly in?uential 
states like China, India and Brazil. This entails that ?AT? is not only perceived 
as an enforcer of the speci?c interests of western industrialised countries.
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NATO and Russia
?AT?’s ?? Member States and Russia extensively cooperate in the ?AT??Russia 
Council which deals with military?to?military cooperation, the ?ght against 
terrorism and civil emergency planning. ?AT? Member States and Russia have 
declared at the level of heads of state that, rather than posing a threat to each 
other, they are partners to one another. The ?AT??Russia relationship mirrors 
the changes in the ?S?Russian relationships.
In addition to ?AT? enlargement the key disagreement involves missile 
defence, which, on the other hand, could also offer the possibility for a new 
type of cooperation.
Conclusion 
Finland has participated in ?AT? Partnership since its inception. From 
the Finnish standpoint the reform of ?AT?’s partnership policy is a 
positive development. The consistent opening of activities to all partner 
countries has also presented some challenges to Finland. Finland aims 
to further develop ?AT? cooperation in a mutually bene?cial way. 
NATO missile defence system
According to the decisions of the Lisbon Summit (2010) NATO would create a strategic 
Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) capability to protect European populations, territory and 
forces. This capability supports the implementation of the collective defence task.
The strategic missile defence capability will be created by expanding the theatre-level tactical 
missile defence system (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence, ALTBMD), which 
protects troops in operations. The components of the US national missile defence system to 
be positioned in Europe (Poland, Romania, Turkey and Spain) represent the fulcrum of the 
strategic missile defence capability. 
In the Chicago Summit (2012) it was declared that the NATO missile defence system has 
reached interim capability. This phase was considered to have been achieved when US national 
missile defence systems positioned in Europe had reached initial operational capability under 
NATO command and control. The goal is that the system will reach full operational capability 
by the end of this decade.
At the Lisbon Summit NATO agreed to pursue cooperation with Russia on strategic missile 
defence. However, progress in the ﬂedgling NATO-Russian missile defence cooperation 
has been slow. Whereas Russia’s point of departure entails a joint system and a ‘sectoral’ 
approach to the defence of Europe, NATO is aiming for cooperation between two separate 
systems, and has proposed the creation of a joint situation picture with Russia. Through 
tangible cooperation NATO is trying to demonstrate that the system is not intended to be 
used against Russia.
The Lisbon Summit also raised the possibility of cooperation with partners.
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2.4 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
 and the Council of Europe
The vision for a free, democratic, united and indivisible Europe advanced in 
the post?Cold War era. However, the progress then slowed to a halt in the ??st 
Century. The concept of wide, cooperative, equal and indivisible security is 
increasingly topical in strengthening stability and security in Europe. 
At the ?SCE’s Astana Summit Meeting in ???? the participating countries 
recommitted themselves to the vision of a Euro?Atlantic and Eurasian security 
community stretching from Vancouver to Vladivostok. In recent years the 
?SCE has particularly focused on election observation missions, democracy 
and con?ict prevention.
In order to proceed with the uni?cation process in the wider Euro?Atlantic and 
Eurasian area, which includes the Caucasus and Central Asia, it is imperative 
to resolve protracted political con?icts, reform arms control regimes and 
strengthen the commitment to common norms in practice. Russia plays a 
pivotal role with regard to any progress in these questions.
Mistrust between the Member States resonates in the debate on reforming 
the ?SCE. Russia believes that the ?SCE’s practical activities one?sidedly 
focus on achieving political change in countries that relate to its security 
interests. Election monitoring is a persistent point of contention. The impasse 
in the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe ?CFE? Treaty negotiations creates 
distrust. Even though the military equilibrium, as a whole, is not threatened in 
the area of the ?SCE, military transparency as well as con?dence and security?
building measures are needed in regional and local con?icts. The signi?cance 
of the ?SCE must also be evaluated against the backdrop of Russia having 
begun to push for Eurasian integration, in which it has a leading role.
The geopolitical standing of Central Asian countries hinges on their location 
and natural resources. It is important to keep them within the sphere of ?SCE 
commitments and assistance. In ?ovember ???? Mongolia was accepted as a 
new Member State of the ?SCE. This opens up entirely new vistas for ?SCE 
activities in Asia. 
The impact of the Middle East and Afghanistan on the security of wider Europe 
arises from geographical proximity as well as their strategic importance as 
zones of con?ict. The spillover effects into the area of the ?SCE can include 
Islamist extremism, the narcotics traf?cking and the proliferation of WMDs. 
The stabilisation of Afghanistan, following the end of ISAF operation  in ????, 
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will speci?cally impact the security of Central Asia and Russia. It will continue 
to be an important target for international security cooperation. 
In addition to the ?SCE the Council of Europe strengthens the shared value 
base. The Council of Europe plays a central role in consolidating democracy, 
human rights and the rule of law in Europe. The Council plays an important 
role in developing treaty regimes and it also continues to focus on promoting 
tolerance and advancing the rights of minorities.  
Despite the states’ commitments and the long?standing efforts of the ?SCE, 
the Council of Europe, other organisations and increasingly stronger civil 
societies, the zone of stable democracies has not expanded in recent years. 
Conclusion
The goal of reinforcing common values through the ?SCE and the 
Council of Europe advances the creation of a security community in 
Europe. 
3 Security development in Finland’s neighbourhood
3.1 Cooperation in strengthening comprehensive security 
Neighbouring areas
The security situation is good in Finland’s neighbourhood. The consolidation of 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea area and in the north, based on mutual interests, 
strengthens stability and promotes comprehensive security in Finland’s 
neighbourhood. Regional cooperation in ?orthern Europe is an important 
addition to the development in Europe and beyond. 
Long?standing cooperation in Finland’s neighbourhood covers common 
problems such as environmental threats, nuclear safety, major accidents and 
disasters, cross?border organised crime, illicit immigration, cyber threats and 
issues related to public health.
Established cooperation in the Baltic Sea region, especially within the framework 
of the Council of the Baltic Sea States ?CBSS?, bene?ts the environment, the 
economy, transport, research and other ?elds of society. States around the 
Baltic Rim share the bene?ts of keeping the transit route open and accident?
free as well as clean and viable. This supports stability in the region. The 
?ord Stream Pipeline increases the signi?cance of the Baltic Sea in economic 
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interaction in which Russia and the European ?nion depend on each other. 
The volume of oil transports in the Baltic Sea will grow sharply, which also 
increases the risks of accidents and environmental disasters in shipping. 
The ?orthern Dimension and the E? Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region fuse 
the ?nion’s collective prestige and resources into cooperation which has 
achieved good results, especially in the ?eld of the environment. The ?orthern 
Dimension is a policy shared by the E?, Russia, ?orway and Iceland. Concrete 
cooperation takes place within the framework of the Dimension to alleviate 
problems in areas such as wastewater management, nuclear safety, transport 
and infectious diseases. Russia’s participation in institutionalised regional 
cooperation is important, and new venues of cooperation are presently being 
sought. The E? Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region aims to improve cooperation 
between the actors in the area, and to better utilise the E??funded programmes 
intended to improve the maritime environment, economic development, appeal 
and security of the Baltic Sea area.
Factbox: The civilian authorities’ multilateral cooperative arrangements in Finland’s neighbourhood, 
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The Arctic region
The consequences of climate change to the Arctic environment are profound. 
It is estimated that temperatures will increase at about twice the global rate in 
the Arctic region. As a result of this the vegetation zones in the Arctic will shift, 
the diversity and distribution of fauna will change, the polar ice cap as a whole 
will continue to shrink and the permafrost will melt in places. Climate change 
will increase the commercial utilisation of the northern sea routes ??ortheast 
Passage, ?orthwest Passage? in the coming decades.
There is great interest in exploiting the abundant natural resources of the 
Arctic region. The management of environmental issues requires improved 
technologies, better infrastructure and maritime safety as well as more 
sophisticated navigation systems. It also requires a balanced approach in the 
tolerance of the environment to Arctic business activities and tapping into 
international cooperation.
The development of transport routes as well as communications and logistics 
networks in the ?orthern Arctic ?cean is paramount to the economy of the 
northern regions. The oil and gas reserves are almost exclusively located on 
the continental shelves or in the economic zones of Arctic ?cean rim states 
and so they control the manner by which the resources will be brought online. 
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There are several unresolved questions pertaining to the rights of the coastal 
states of the region and these have to be resolved in accordance with 
international law. The present international treaty regime, in particular the 
?nited ?ations Convention on the Law of the Sea ???CL?S?, provides a basis 
for the handling of Arctic questions. 
In ????, after ?? years of negotiations ?orway and Russia signed a historically 
important treaty on maritime delimitation and cooperation in the Barents 
Sea and the Arctic ?cean. There are still unresolved maritime delimitation 
issues between Denmark?Greenland, Canada and the ?nited States. In the 
coming years Russia, Canada and Denmark will make their submissions to the 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf regarding the extension 
of their continental shelves. As regards the northern sea areas, thus far the 
Commission has only adopted the ?nal recommendations on the outer limits of 
?orway’s continental shelf. The ?nited States has yet to ratify the Convention.
The Arctic ?cean rim states have agreed that they will attempt to resolve 
delimitation questions on the basis of international law and scienti?c data. The 
ongoing assessments and their results will echo on the states’ views on Arctic 
cooperation.
In their national Arctic strategies Russia and Canada emphasise their 
sovereignty in their Arctic regions. The rim states are modernising their 
maritime surveillance and military equipment suited to the Polar regions, and 
the number of exercises in the vicinity of the region is on the rise. Russia does 
not want ?AT? or China to increase their presence in the Arctic region. 
When it comes to security policy the Arctic region is stable, and a military con?ict 
in the area is considered to be unlikely. ?onetheless, security developments 
in the region must be monitored. A goal shared by all Arctic ?cean rim states 
and the other Member States of the Arctic Council is to preserve and promote 
peaceful cooperation in the Arctic region. 
Conclusions
Finland maintains close and wide?ranging relationships in its 
neighbourhood, and actively participates in establishing and developing 
cooperative structures in the area. Comprehensive cooperation in these 
structures promotes stability in Finland’s neighbourhood.
When it comes to Arctic questions Finland supports the efforts of 
international and regional organisations. The Arctic Council, the Barents 
Euro?Arctic Council and the International Maritime ?rganisation ?IM?? 
play important roles in Arctic questions. The ?nited ?ations Convention 
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on the Law of the Sea lays a comprehensive foundation for the terms 
of using and protecting the world’s seas. The Arctic Council implements 
collaborative programmes in the ?eld of sustainable development.
Finland has actively developed the cooperative structures in the area of 
the Baltic Sea, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States ?CBSS? and 
by utilising the E? Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region.
The Arctic Council, the Barents Euro-Arctic Council and the Council  
of the Baltic Sea States
All three councils are intergovernmental cooperative fora which operate in their respective 
geographic areas. The Arctic Council was founded in 1996 and its Member States include 
the eight Arctic states and representatives of indigenous peoples. It comprehensively covers 
issues related to the region such as the environment, navigation, research and treaty regimes. 
The Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Poland, France and Germany have observer 
status in the Council.
The purpose of the Barents Euro-Arctic Council is to promote stability, sustainable 
development and security in the Barents area, the most populated area in the Arctic region. 
The Council was founded in 1993 and, in addition to its seven permanent members, observer 
states include the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada, Poland, France, Germany 
and the United States.
The Council of the Baltic Sea States was established in 1992 to promote democracy and 
economic development in the Baltic Sea Region. In addition to the Members of the Council 
there are observer states (the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, Italy, Slovakia, France, 
Romania, Ukraine, Belarus and the United States).
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3.2 The security and defence policy of Nordic countries, and security  
 cooperation
The ?ordic countries are forerunners in the provision of security. In addition, 
there is broad support for ?ordic cooperation among Finns. The ?ordic 
countries make up a strong value community and an area of close interaction. 
There is a long tradition of active, practical cooperation between the civilian 
authorities. The ?eld of defence is the newest addition to this cooperation 
and is viewed favourably by the citizens. The development of ?ordic defence 
cooperation ???RDEFC?? was launched in ???? by the joint initiative of the 
chiefs of defence of Finland, ?orway and Sweden. In ???? the report of 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, the former foreign minister of ?orway, gave it signi?cant 
impetus as regards cooperation in ?ordic foreign and security policy. 
The proposals of the Stoltenberg report (2009) to increase Nordic cooperation
1.    Nordic stabilisation Task Force. A Nordic stabilisation task force should be established 
that can be deployed to states affected by major internal unrest or other critical situations 
where international assistance is desirable.
2.    Nordic cooperation on surveillance of Icelandic airspace. The Nordic countries 
should take on part of the responsibility for air surveillance and air patrolling over Iceland. 
The Nordic cooperation could be developed in three phases.
3.    Nordic maritime monitoring system. A Nordic system should be established for 
monitoring and early warning in the Nordic sea areas. The system should in principle 
be civilian and be designed for tasks such as monitoring the marine environment and 
pollution and monitoring of civilian trafﬁc.
4.    Maritime response force. Once a Nordic maritime monitoring system is in place, a 
Nordic maritime response force should be established. One of its main responsibilities 
should be search and rescue.
5.    Satellite system for surveillance and communications. By 2020, a Nordic polar orbit 
satellite system should be established in connection with the development of a Nordic 
maritime monitoring system.
6.    Nordic cooperation on Arctic issues. The Nordic countries, which are all members of 
the Arctic Council, should develop cooperation on Arctic issues focusing on more practical 
matters. The environment, climate change, maritime safety and search and rescue services 
are appropriate areas for such cooperation.
7.    Nordic resource network to protect against cyber attacks. A Nordic resource 
network should be established to defend the Nordic countries against cyber attacks.
8.    Disaster response unit. A Nordic disaster response unit should be established for dealing 
with large-scale disasters and accidents in the Nordic region and in other countries. The 
unit’s main task would be to coordinate Nordic efforts as needed.
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9.  War crimes investigation unit. A joint investigation unit should be established to 
coordinate the Nordic countries’ investigation of genocide, crimes against humanity and 
war crimes committed by persons residing in the Nordic countries.
10.  Cooperation between foreign services. In countries and areas where no Nordic 
country has an embassy or consulate general, the countries could establish and run joint 
diplomatic and consular missions.
11.  Military cooperation on transport, medical services, education, materiel and 
exercise ranges. The Nordic countries should strengthen their defence cooperation on 
medical services, education, materiel and exercise ranges.
12.  Amphibious unit. A Nordic amphibious unit should be established based on existing 
units and the current cooperation between Sweden and Finland. The unit could be 
employed in international operations.
13.  Nordic declaration of solidarity. The Nordic governments should issue a mutual 
declaration of solidarity in which they commit themselves to clarifying how they would 
respond if a Nordic country were subject to external attack or undue pressure.
Source: Stoltenberg, Thorvald (2009): Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Policy. 
Proposals presented to the extraordinary meeting of Nordic foreign ministers in Oslo on 9 
February 2009.
It is natural for the ?ordic countries to cooperate in the ?eld of foreign and 
security policy in the spirit of solidarity. Regarding the interested parties the 
???? ?ordic declaration on solidarity involves potential risks, such as natural 
and man?made disasters, cyber and terrorist attacks. Should a ?ordic country 
be affected, the others will, upon request from that country, assist with relevant 
means. The intensi?ed ?ordic cooperation will be undertaken fully in line with 
each country’s security and defence policy and complement existing European 
and Euro?Atlantic cooperation.
Sweden promotes more exhaustive security commitments. For its part, the 
Swedish government declared that Sweden will not remain passive should 
another E? Member State or ?ordic country be struck by disaster or attack. 
By the same token, Sweden expects that the E? and the ?ordic countries do 
the same if a disaster or attack were to befall Sweden. Sweden must have the 
capability to provide and receive military assistance.
The ?ordic countries’ geographical proximity, their shared security environment 
and the similar tasks, goals and operating cultures of their defence forces, 
facilitate and foster wide?ranging defence cooperation and common solutions 
among the ?ordic countries. Finland is preparing to assume the presidency of 
??RDEFC? in ????.
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?ordic cooperation strives to achieve added operational, economic and 
technical value for defence. This will enable closer cooperation between the 
?ordic defence forces as well as the common development of pooled and 
shared national military capabilities. Capabilities development between the 
?ordic countries also complements the capabilities cooperation done under 
the auspices of ?AT? and the E?.
Nordic Defence Cooperation, NORDEFCO
Whilst Nordic cooperation has signiﬁcantly intensiﬁed in recent years, it already has a long 
tradition. For example, crisis management cooperation has been implemented since the 
1960s and defence materiel cooperation since 1994. In 2009 a decision was taken to combine 
the cooperation under the single umbrella of Nordic Defence Cooperation, NORDEFCO.
NORDEFCO is a cooperative structure, comprising a ﬂexible combination of experts and 
decision-makers from the political and military levels of the Nordic defence establishments. 
The cooperation strives for cost-effectiveness. Simultaneously, it aims to bring operational, 
economic, technical and industrial added value as well as interoperability which would 
facilitate even better cooperation between the Nordic defence forces in the future. The 
cooperation complements the nations’ national defence solutions as well as bilateral, EU 
and NATO cooperation. At present the daily cooperation covers the following areas: defence 
policy, strategic development, capabilities, human resources and education, training and 
exercises and operations.
The Nordic countries have already greatly proﬁted from cooperation. Many tangible results 
have been achieved in logistics as well as training and exercises, to name but a few. The 
practical examples also include crisis management cooperation, combining strategic 
transports and logistics in the operation in Afghanistan, air cross-border air exercises, the 
army’s ground-based air defence and gunnery practice exercises, cooperation on naval 
countermeasures and joint exercises, the creation of a Nordic Center for Gender and the 
support to East African crisis management capability.
The strongest points of Nordic defence cooperation include the ﬂexible format and that the 
countries can select in which cooperative projects they want to participate. More often than 
not cooperation occurs between two or three Nordic countries. At the same time a part of the 
cooperation is implemented within the framework of the EU or NATO. A good example of this 
is the so-called NORDIC+ crisis management cooperation in the NATO-led Operation ISAF in 
Afghanistan, and the cooperation in the European Union’s Nordic battle group.
The countries in the Baltic Sea area and in the Arctic Council are interested 
in security policy cooperation with the ?ordic countries. The ?nited States is 
continuing the security dialogue related, especially, to the environs of ?orthern 
Europe with the ?ordic countries and Baltic states in the Enhanced Partnership 
in ?orthern Europe ?e?PI?E? format. The Baltic states have been invited to 
participate in some ??RDEFC? joint projects.
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The ?ordic countries participate in exercises with Russia in maritime rescue 
and oil recovery, among other things. 
Sweden is an in?uential international actor. It has a solid standing in the ?? 
and the E?. In addition, it has sound bilateral relations and it is also the key 
player in ?ordic cooperation. Whereas Sweden is not planning to apply for 
?AT? membership, it has traditionally engaged in close cooperation within the 
framework of ?AT? partnership.
Sweden and Finland have a close security policy relationship. There is an 
understanding that they consult each other on security policy questions 
and evaluate the signi?cance of each other’s policy positions from their own 
standpoint.
Sweden actively participates and in?uences security policy and international 
crisis management. Sweden has made a valuable contribution to ?AT? 
operations in Afghanistan and ?osovo, and it had an important role in the ???
mandated, ?AT??led operation in Libya. 
Sweden is politically prepared to increase its own role, and that of the 
?ordic countries, in the preservation of regional security: it is developing the 
appropriate capabilities for this. Sweden’s security policy guidelines emphasise 
both solidarity and collective security generated in concert with other countries 
and international organisations. The policy is based on the Swedish view that 
military con?icts or other threats in its neighbourhood would not impact one 
country alone. 
In line with its security policy Sweden will follow through with its landmark 
decision of imposing numerical cuts to its defence forces while launching 
qualitative improvements aimed at improving their deployability. By ???? the 
total wartime strength of Sweden will decrease to 5? ??? troops, ?? ??? of 
which will belong to the Home Guard. Apart from the Home Guard all other 
troops can be deployed to international tasks. Sweden’s defence reform has 
been positively regarded by ?AT?. 
By ????, following its reform, Sweden aims to achieve the target of maintaining 
? ??? troops in constant readiness for national or international tasks. This 
number includes the troops that are already deployed to operations, the 
national high?readiness troops and those in the E?’s Battle Group standby 
rotation.  
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?orway and Denmark base their security on ?AT? membership. Support for 
E? accession has not been on the rise in ?orway. By virtue of its caveat at 
the level of the Treaty on European ?nion Denmark opted out of the E?’s 
military activities. However, it actively participates in the E?’s civilian crisis 
management operations. 
?orway and Denmark have staunchly contributed to ?AT??led crisis 
management, especially in Afghanistan and, in the past, in Libya, and to 
?AT?’s defence planning. While the troop strengths of their defence forces 
have been cut, their capabilities and deployability have been improved from 
the perspective of crisis management participation. 
Iceland is a ?AT? Member State and its pre?accession process with the E? is 
presently ongoing. Iceland has signed a bilateral defence agreement with the 
?nited States. The country has no armed forces of its own, nor are there any 
permanently stationed foreign troops on its territory. Icelandic air surveillance 
is carried out by ?AT? with periodic rotations in which ?orway and Denmark 
have also participated. In reference to the proposal of the Stoltenberg report, 
Iceland has also expressed the wish that Finland and Sweden participate in the 
air surveillance as a ?ordic project. 
Conclusions
The intensifying ?ordic foreign, security and defence policy cooperation 
supports the strengthening of the role of the ?ordic countries in the 
international arena, promotes stability in ?orthern Europe as well as 
in the Baltic Sea area and northern regions, and provides a practical 
approach to handling wide?ranging security questions. Closer ?ordic 
cooperation advances and expands Finland’s options in in?uencing its 
neighbourhood.
?ordic defence cooperation improves cost?effectiveness and 
interoperability. Cooperation in international crisis management 
operations is already time?honoured. ??RDEFC? provides the framework 
for the intensi?cation of defence cooperation. 
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The defence budgets of Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Estonia  
from 2000–2013
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Sources: SIPRI and, for the most recent years, the information provided by the countries’ respective 
ministries of defence
When it comes to Finland, the information from 2000-2011 is based on the ﬁnal central government 
accounts, the information from 2012 is based on the Government budget, and the information for 
2013 on the budget proposal (17 September 2012).
3.3 The security and defence policy of the Baltic states
The security policies of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are based on ?AT? 
membership. Simultaneously, they underscore their relationships with the 
?nited States. In addition, E? membership carries security policy signi?cance 
to the Baltic states.
The Baltic states contribute to ?AT? activities and actively participate 
in international crisis management, in ?AT? and the E? alike. Defence 
development within ?AT? and the participation of the ?nited States in the 
security of its European allies are questions of vital importance for the Baltic 
states. They have required that ?AT? update the defence plan for the region 
which, presumably, has been done.
Baltic air policing is an established system in ?AT?. It is important for the 
Baltic states that their air policing is carried out as a ?AT? core task, i.e. by 
?AT? Member States alone.
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Conclusions
The increasing participation of the Baltic states in ?ordic and Baltic Sea 
region cooperation is a positive development. 
The Baltic states are close partners to Finland in deepening security and 
defence policy dialogue as well. 
3.4 Russia’s security and defence policy in its neighbouring areas 
Russia’s internal stability, its economic development and its military 
modernisation programme are factors which fundamentally impact Finland’s 
security environment. Apart from oil and natural gas production the bulk of 
Russia’s population as well as most of its infrastructure and the facilities for 
its economic activity are located in its northwestern and western regions. The 
signi?cance of the Baltic Sea region is of key importance to Russia’s foreign 
trade and energy policy. The area is strategically vital to the capacity of the 
nation. 
The positioning, composition and exercises of the Russian armed forces in 
the Western Military District  focus on protecting the strategically important 
greater St Petersburg area and the ?ola Peninsula. The goal is to improve 
the capabilities of the troops in the northwest by rationalising functions and 
command structures, replacing obsolete defence materiel and by improving 
the conditions of the troops. ?ey goals include the efforts to achieve high 
readiness, improved power projection capabilities and a capacity that can 
make an impact in Russia’s neighbouring areas. 
Russia views ?AT? enlargement as a political and military problem. According 
to the Russian view, the enlargement weakens its foreign policy goal of 
achieving a multipolar world order and jeopardises its sphere of interest. 
Russia has been unreceptive towards its neighbours’ approaches towards 
?AT?, objecting speci?cally to the ?AT? membership aspirations of Georgia 
and the past ambitions of ?kraine. 
Russia is developing the Arctic military capacities of all of its military services. 
The intention is to better equip the Army for the northern environment. ?aval 
supply bases will be built along the northern waterway and air bases in the 
Barents Sea area such as ?ovaya ?emlya will be reopened and modernised 
for the air force. The ?ola Peninsula continues to remain highly important in 
Russian military thinking. Russia also intends to improve its air defences of 
the ?ola Peninsula and St Petersburg as well as ?aliningrad by deploying the 
most modern and capable ground?based air defence missile systems there. 
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Russia’s armed forces are developing their strike capability, among other 
things, through the Army’s new ballistic missile systems, and by procuring new 
?ghter?bombers for the air force. 
The signi?cance of the Arctic region is not only economically important to Russia. 
It also has wider security policy signi?cance. The opening of the ?ortheast 
Passage increases Russia’s territorial surveillance tasks and responsibilities 
over maritime safety. The increasing strategic signi?cance of the region will 
also re?ect on Russia’s military policy decisions. 
Russia considers the Arctic region to be its sphere of interest. According to 
Russia, only Arctic ?cean rim states have a legitimate right to participate in 
decision?making related to the region. Its central goal is to keep control of 
the use of raw materials in the hands of the states of the region. Then again, 
Russia needs to cooperate with foreign businesses in bringing its raw material 
reserves online. 
Conclusion 
Russia’s foreign policy, its societal development and the transformation of 
its armed forces impact Finland’s neighbourhood. Positive developments 
in ?AT??Russia relations promote stability in the region. 
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SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
4 Security policy 
4.1 Central premises and key policies
Central premises
The foreign, security and defence policy of Finland safeguards the independence, 
territorial integrity and common values of society. Maintaining the security 
and prosperity of the nation and the undisturbed functioning of society are 
at the core of these policies. Based on a concept of comprehensive security 
that is in?uenced by changing factors, the use of multiple instruments in the 
implementation of these policies is called for.
Finland’s security policy actively furthers security as well as anticipates 
and responds to  security threats. Finland must analyse the global security 
environment, anticipate the developments therein and ensure that the selected 
security policy guidelines promote international collaboration and cooperative 
security in the most optimal way as well as promote Finland’s international 
status, values, interests and security. 
Finland’s security and defence policy is characterised by continuity, transparency 
and a strong commitment to European and international collaboration. These 
are epitomised by active participation in the development of the E?’s common 
security and defence policy, ?AT? partnership, ?ordic cooperation and 
international crisis management.
It is important to strengthen the E?’s cohesion and capacity. From the 
standpoint of Finland’s interests it is vital to strengthen the ?nion’s common 
values, societal well?being, economic competitiveness, international appeal 
and global in?uence. An internationally robust, united and capable ?nion 
also serves Finland’s interests. Membership of the E? is a fundamental 
security policy choice for Finland. The ?nion’s wide?ranging activities increase 
European integration between Member States and have a positive impact on 
their international and security policy roles. They also promote the well?being 
and security of citizens and sustain the viability of society. Finland, being an 
active and involved Member State, is committed to the political union, whose 
Member States share a sense of unity and the will to collaborate on wide?
ranging issues.
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The importance of the European ?nion to the security of Finland is profound 
and multifaceted. It widely impacts Finland’s security environment at global 
and European levels as well as in Finland’s environs. The ?nion is a key actor 
in issues related to the functioning of society, internal security and in tackling 
border management challenges.
Finland’s security is built on good bilateral relations, active in?uencing in the 
European ?nion as well as wide?ranging cooperation with other states and 
international actors. Finland aims to consolidate international stability, security, 
peace and justice as well as sustainable development, and to advance the 
rule of law, democracy and human rights. Finland participates in international 
burden?sharing, in the development of global governance and takes an active 
part in efforts to ?nd solutions to international problems. Finland aims to 
strengthen the role of the ??.
Security policy will take into account the importance of cross?border threats as 
well as international cooperation in combating them. In addition, the signi?cance 
of the internal state of societies is highlighted as part of comprehensive 
security. Security can also be bolstered by promoting societal well?being and 
by preventing tension, social exclusion and segregation. 
While the probability of armed aggression against Finland is low and, speci?cally, 
of one aiming to seize territory, it cannot be categorically excluded. A security 
threat extending to Finland can emerge within the context of a wider regional 
or European con?ict.
Finland will continue to see to its own defence capability. The defence solution 
is built on a territorial defence system covering the entire area of the country. 
General conscription will remain one of its cornerstones. The goal is to prevent 
security threats and to prepare for them in accordance with the principle of 
comprehensive security. The options provided by multinational cooperation will 
be utilised in maintaining and developing the defence capability. 
The Province of Åland Islands has a recognised status under international 
law. ?pholding the special status of the province does not prevent Finland 
from intensifying defence cooperation within the European ?nion and in 
international organisations.
Key policies
Finland advances and strengthens its bilateral relations with other countries. 
Along with the traditionally signi?cant relations with the ?ordic countries, other 
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Member States of the European ?nion, the ?nited States and Russia, Finland 
intensi?es its relationships with the emerging countries.
The aim is to develop the European ?nion so as to improve its external role, 
security and competitiveness. The goal is to strengthen the structures and 
activities which advance the E?’s global role as a value?based actor that 
coherently taps into a wide range of instruments. 
Finland strives for the extensive development of the E?’s external relations by 
emphasising strategic partnerships with key global actors and the importance 
of the European neighbourhood to Europe’s prosperity and security. In 
accordance with the options provided by the Lisbon Treaty, Finland increasingly 
promotes both a more effective common foreign and security policy ?CFSP? 
and a common security and defence policy ?CSDP?.
Finland is not a member of a military alliance, but cooperates with the ?orth 
Atlantic Treaty ?rganisation and maintains the option of applying for ?AT? 
membership. Finland is not preparing to apply for ?AT? membership during 
the present Government’s term of of?ce. Finland will evaluate its possible ?AT? 
membership on the grounds of its own national security and defence policy 
interests. Finland promotes cooperation between the European ?nion and 
?AT?, recognising ?AT?’s importance as the key forum of European security 
policy. Defence development will see to it that no practical impediments are 
created for possible military alignment.
?ordic foreign, security and defence policy cooperation will be intensi?ed. 
Deepening collaboration facilitates the maintenance and development of military 
capabilities. Furthermore, this cooperation improves interoperability, which 
facilitates more effective cooperation in training and exercises, surveillance 
missions, procurement projects and crisis management operations. 
The ??, being a universal global organisation, has a central role in strengthening 
multilateral cooperation – which is Finland’s goal as well – and in creating 
an international order based on international law. Finland supports con?ict 
prevention, crisis management, mediation and peacebuilding within the 
multilateral system, the E?,international organisations, and bilaterally. 
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4.2 Finland as a Member State of the EU, and cooperation with NATO
Supporting the European Union’s role in strengthening security
A credible, effective and comprehensive E? common foreign and security 
policy serves Finland’s interests. From the Finnish viewpoint the E? should 
strengthen the strategic approach of the CFSP and, if possible, outline a new 
foreign and security policy strategy which draws the necessary conclusions 
from the changing operating environment. A common vision of the E? for the 
key priorities and their order, as well as the consistent use of resources and 
instruments will also intensify the impact of the ?nion’s external policy in its 
entirety.
Finland is committed to the development of the common security and defence 
policy. The possibilities for collaboration between like?minded countries must 
be utilised in achieving this goal. It is important for Finland that the E? 
comprehensively develop its crisis management activities. The long?term goal 
involves the creation of the E?’s permanent planning and conduct capability 
for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of crisis management.
Any new political division regarding the development of the CSDP within the 
E? must be avoided. All Member States should participate in its development. 
If, however, this is not feasible Finland is prepared to support work in smaller 
groups. Permanent structural cooperation provides an option for developing 
military capabilities within smaller groups.
The European ?nion’s area of freedom, security and justice should be further 
enhanced. This applies to the area in which internal and external security 
questions are intertwined. Furthermore, the ?nion itself, too, should develop 
the means of consolidating the fundamental rights and the rule of law in its 
Member States.
Finland actively promotes further E? enlargement. All European countries 
that meet the membership criteria should have the possibility to to accede to 
the ?nion. The accession process of Turkey and its intensifying partnership 
with the E?, especially as Turkey’s regional and global role is continuously 
growing, also strengthen Europe’s security environment. Finland promotes 
the European ?eighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership in order to 
support reforms in its eastern and southern neighbourhood, and to stabilise 
the countries therein.
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Cooperation with NATO
?AT?’s intensifying cooperation with the E?, the ??, the ?SCE and other 
international and regional organisations is a positive development from the 
Finnish viewpoint. ?AT? continues to be the key European security policy 
actor. The role of ?AT? and the commitment of the ?nited States to Europe 
are vital aspects in maintaining the security of the continent.
Wide?ranging cooperation with ?AT? will continue. In addition to the defence 
sector, several administrative branches cooperate with ?AT? in ?elds such as 
civil emergency planning and contingency planning.
Finland actively participates in the development of ?AT?’s partnership policy. 
Finland supports the development of cooperation within the framework of 
?exible, thematic structures. Crisis management and capabilities cooperation 
are the crux of Finland’s partnership cooperation. Finland, at its own discretion, 
continues to participate in ?AT??led crisis management operations. Finland 
considers it important that operational partners be allowed to participate in the 
planning and preparation phases of new operations. 
Finland continues to comprehensively tap into the instruments provided 
by ?AT? in developing the capabilities of the Finnish Defence Forces. By 
participating in ?AT?’s Planning and Review Process ?PARP? and the ?perational 
Capabilities Concept ??CC?, and by developing its capacity to participate in the 
activities supplementing the ?AT? Response Force ??RF?, Finland develops 
interoperability and improves its capacity to participate in international crisis 
management, irrespective of whether the operation is led by ?AT?, the E? or 
the ??. The development of military interoperability also improves Finland’s 
technical preparedness to receive international assistance in a crisis.
4.3 Other key actors
Finland engages in extensive bilateral cooperation with the ?nited States 
and values the continued commitment of the ?nited States in multilateral 
cooperation.
Finland also aims to advance the cooperation between the E? and the ?SA so 
that the partnership improves the global security environment and advances 
the solution of international problems. It is important for Finland that Europe 
remain an interesting cooperation area for the ?SA, and that the ?nited States 
support security, stability and well?being in the region.
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Finland develops its relationship with Russia through close interaction 
and cooperation at the political level, between the authorities, through the 
economy and at the level of citizens. Furthermore, Finland encourages Russia 
to participate in regional cooperation in its neighbourhood.
It is Finland’s goal that Russia strongly commit to international cooperation 
and multilateral treaty regimes and global burden?sharing. Finland actively 
promotes a broad?based development of the E??Russia relationship. E??
Russian cooperation should also be developed in the ?eld of foreign and 
security policy.
Finland also develops its relationships with the emerging states and supports the 
development of the E?’s strategic partnerships. Finland intensi?es its political 
and economic relationship with China in areas that are of particular interest 
to Finland and essential to the development of China, such as environmental 
technology and renewables, and topics related to good governance and the 
rule of law.
Finland continues to invest in versatile bilateral relations with developing 
countries. Development policy is a key instrument in this cooperation. Trade 
relations, too, will be broadly developed. 
4.4 The promotion of global security 
Supporting the multilateral system
Finland advocates increasingly robust global governance structures and in 
particular the development of the capacity of the ?? system. The ?? and its 
Security Council have a central role in legitimising universally binding solutions. 
The Security Council should be expanded so as to make it more representative. 
It should also be made more ef?cient by increasing transparency, among other 
things.
The international economic crisis must be resolved and international economic 
interaction must be reformed in a manner that strengthens sustainable 
development, fair global governance and transparent economic interaction. 
Finland particularly in?uences the international economy within the E? and 
through the ?ordic community. Finland aims to internationally highlight the 
model of the ?ordic welfare state which has prevailed and demonstrated its 
effectiveness and resilience in the global transition.
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Finland promotes the strengthening of international law and, especially the 
work of the International Criminal Court ?ICC? and other international war 
crimes tribunals in their efforts to reduce impunity. Finland aims to advocate 
the application of the international Responsibility to Protect ?RtoP? principle.
Finland operates within the framework of the ?SCE to sustain and strengthen 
its principles and standards, and to comprehensively develop the organisation. 
The role of the ?SCE as the proponent for wider European security development 
and uni?cation should be preserved. Finland promotes the strengthening and 
promotion of the standards and mechanisms developed by the Council of 
Europe, and supports the focusing of the activities of the Council of Europe on 
the promotion of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. 
Using a wide range of instruments 
Finland supports con?ict prevention and management as well as peacebuilding 
through the means of foreign, trade and development policies, and by 
participating in the development of civilian and military crisis management, 
mediation, humanitarian assistance, arms control and the promotion of human 
rights. 
Finland in?uences the development of international mediation within the 
framework of the ??. Finland and Turkey have jointly established the Group 
of Friends of Mediation. Finland is actively involved in the development of 
the E?’s mediation capacity and bilaterally supports the strengthening of the 
mediation capacities of regional organisations, such as the African ?nion. The 
role of women in peace processes is strengthened and mediation resources are 
improved in Finland and in the ?ordic context.
?nder Government guidelines development cooperation funds can be increased 
to advance comprehensive security in areas where Finland supports mediation, 
peacekeeping and crisis management activities. Suf?cient resources will be 
earmarked for this purpose.
Tasks related to mediation, security sector reform and the rule of law often 
require rapid reaction and the ?exible use of resources. In view of this the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs has already introduced a simpli?ed and expedited 
?nancing process for mediation. Should there be a need to establish new 
mechanisms in addition to the existing ones, the possibilities of implementing 
them will be studied. Functions excluded by the criteria for of?cial development 
assistance will not be ?nanced through development cooperation funds.
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International sanctions are an important element of the comprehensive 
approach in con?ict prevention and management. Finland actively participates 
in the development of the international sanctions regime by emphasising the 
role of the ?? Security Council as the originator of decisions that are binding to 
all ?? Member States. Sanctions also comprise a key feature in the E?’s range 
of instruments. The wider the international support, the more effective the 
sanction regimes. Finland regards it important that sanctions be as accurately 
targeted as possible, and that the negative impacts to those not concerned be 
minimised and that the targets of sanctions retain the due protection of law.
Participation in international crisis management 
Finland continues to participate in crisis management tasks in order to support 
security, stability and con?ict solution, and to strengthen Finland’s security, 
international standing and defence capability. Military crisis management 
develops the skills and capabilities needed in defending Finland and in crises 
affecting us. Finland aims to improve the effectiveness of its crisis management 
activities and its comprehensive participation in demanding international crisis 
management activities in a manner that takes into account Finland’s strengths. 
The objective is to have Finns in leading positions of crisis management 
operations.
Military and civilian crisis management can be used in a complementary manner, 
tailored to the speci?c needs of each crisis area and international mission. 
Military and civilian crisis management as well as development cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance should be coordinated to achieve the best possible 
and sustainable combined effects. Whereas the roles and responsibilities of 
military and civilian crisis management as well as development cooperation and 
humanitarian assistance are distinct, they can mutually reinforce each other. 
The ?? principles of independence, impartiality and humanity are followed 
when it comes to the implementation of humanitarian assistance.
Supporting a crisis area’s own security structures and the rule of law, and 
training its security sector, strengthens the basic structures of society. Alongside 
operational participation, increasing attention is given to the export of crisis 
management training expertise. The goal is to boost the developing countries’ 
local crisis management capacities, especially in Africa.
Crisis management will also take into account cross?cutting themes such as the 
promotion of human rights, gender equality, democracy and the rule of law as 
well as cultural and religious dimensions. The status of women and girls as well 
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as their participation in issues related to peace and security will be advanced in 
accordance with the ?ational Action Plan ?Women, Peace and Security’.
Finland participates in military crisis management in accordance with its 
foreign and security policy goals and at a level which sustains Finland’s long?
term commitment to and development of peace and stability, and takes into 
account Finland’s decades?long tradition of participating in peacekeeping and 
military crisis management operations. This strengthens Finland’s international 
standing and indicates a clear desire to participate in international burden?
sharing? it also calls for suf?cient training and resources.
The decision to participate in a crisis management operation will be based on 
foreign and security policy considerations, taking into account the needs of the 
crisis area and the operation, available capabilities and ?nancial resources. The 
decision?making process will also evaluate the impact of our participation and 
any possible bene?ts to our military capabilities. Finland will primarily offer the 
assets to operations which are included in Finland’s troop register.
The budget proposal will prepare to ?nance ongoing operations or those 
in which Finland has already decided to participate. ?ew operations will be 
?nanced through supplementary budgets. In addition, with supplementary 
budget provision, it is possible to cover the ?nancing of additional costs arising 
from operations or to facilitate the continuance of operations, any potential new 
crisis management operations as well as other crisis management expenses.
Finland’s crisis management participation continues to emphasise expertise 
in police, rule of law, border management, human rights and gender equality 
issues. The main focus is on the E?’s civilian crisis management operations. 
Finland also participates in the ??’s efforts in promoting international security 
and stability by allocating civilian assets, stressing the improvement of police 
activities and the rule of law.
Finland also aims to improve the impact of its participation in civilian crisis 
management. The goal is to second approximately ?5? Finnish experts 
to civilian crisis management operations. ?et another goal is to have Finns 
selected to leadership positions of missions. The increasing demands and risks 
to civilian crisis management experts in operations will be taken into account. 
Suf?cient resources will be earmarked for the purpose of seconding Finnish 
experts to civilian crisis management tasks. 
85
The need to review international crisis management legislation or that related 
to other possible international cooperation will be determined later. The aim is 
to begin the review during this Government term. 
Development of multinational defence cooperation
Active defence cooperation bolsters regional stability and increases the 
credibility of defence. Fully??edged participation in multinational cooperation 
makes it possible for Finland to in?uence decisions on new cooperation areas, 
procedures and structures. Situation awareness and international in?uencing 
also demand appropriate representation in international structures. 
Finland is already dependent on multinational cooperation in the development 
and maintenance of military capabilities. It is necessary to intensify cooperation 
in order to secure the capabilities. Finland participates in defence cooperation 
in the ?ordic context, in the E?, within the framework of ?AT? partnership 
and bilaterally. The goals of cooperation in the different combinations and 
structures are mutually reinforcing and complementary. Finland sets out with 
the purpose of achieving practical and ?exible cooperation, while keeping in 
mind the equal opportunities of the domestic defence industry in relation to 
their ?ordic and European competitors.
Finland believes that the E? needs to develop a common vision for foreign, 
security and defence policy, and politically commit to the collective development, 
maintenance, pooling and sharing of military capabilities.
In particular, Finland supports the intensi?cation of ?ordic defence cooperation. 
The goal is to create a common desired end state for ?ordic cooperation to 
advance its expansion and intensi?cation. Finland supports the development 
of cooperation related to the creation, maintenance and use of national and 
shared capabilities, and that of associated modi operandi. The capability for 
joint operations both at home and in Finland’s neighbourhood as well as in 
crisis management operations, including cooperation in defence training and 
exercises, is being further honed.
From the Finnish perspective the E?’s Battle Groups ?E?BG? and participation 
in the activities supplementing the ?AT? Response Force ??RF? as well as 
international training and exercises are key practical instruments when it 
comes to developing the Defence Forces’ capabilities and interoperability.
Finland, at its discretion, continues to participate in the E?BGs and supports 
an increase in their capacity and deployability. Finland also continues to 
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participate in the activities supplementing the ?RF. The primary goal of 
Finland’s participation is to improve the capabilities needed in military crisis 
management. However, the participation also improves the national defence 
capability and the facilities of receiving assistance from abroad.  
Arms control
Finland highlights the importance of the ?? as the keystone of multilateral 
arms control and disarmament structures, and as the primary forum for 
treaty regimes. Finland emphasises the need to intensify the implementation 
of arms control arrangements and to improve their monitoring mechanisms. 
Developing countries will be supported within available means so that they, 
too, can commit to international arms control obligations. 
Finland participates in arms control, disarmament and non?proliferation 
negotiation processes. Finland tries to actively in?uence them, conducting a 
comprehensive analysis regarding the adoption of any new commitments at 
the completion of each process. 
In its own defence arrangements Finland takes into account the existing 
international standards and its own obligations. Finnish defence planning 
also tries to anticipate the development of the standards, the humanitarian 
acceptability of weapon systems and the availability of weapons systems in 
the international market. 
The signi?cance of the Treaty on the ?on?Proliferation of ?uclear Weapons 
??PT? as the cornerstone of the international nuclear arms control regime is 
pivotal. Finland underscores all pillars of the ?PT. Through its own action Finland 
strives to advance transparency related to nuclear weapons, mitigate the risks 
of accidents and misunderstandings, and promote nuclear disarmament. 
In addition to bilateral treaties, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament 
should produce results, ?rst and foremost, on its primary goal, the Fissile 
Material Cut?off Treaty ?FMCT?. Tactical nuclear weapons should be included in 
the multilateral arms control and disarmament regime. It is imperative that the 
Comprehensive ?uclear?Test?Ban Treaty ?CTBT? enter into force.
Finland actively promotes the non?proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery as well as related materials 
and know?how pursuant to, among others, ?? Security Council Resolution 
?5??, the G??launched Global Partnership, the ?S?Russian launched Global 
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Initiative to Combat ?uclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative 
launched by the ?SA. 
In view of biological threats, Finland also pursues international and national 
cooperation between the security and the health authorities. Finland actively 
advances the non?proliferation of chemical weapons and the development of 
means for the veri?cation of chemical agents.
Finland has acceded to the ?ttawa Convention banning anti?personnel 
landmines. In accordance with the Convention Finland’s anti?personnel mine 
stockpiles will be destroyed within four years of its entry into force for Finland. 
Finland also continues its active participation in humanitarian mine action. 
Finland is not a state party to the ?slo Convention on Cluster Munitions. 
However, Finland supports the goals of the convention as well as the attempts 
to universalise it, and participates in the implementation of the convention 
through humanitarian mine action. From the Finnish perspective no such 
changes in conditions have taken place which would enable accession to 
the convention.  Finland actively strives for the ?nalisation and the possible 
implementation of an Arms Trade Treaty which would extensively, effectively 
and comprehensively regulate the international arms trade. Finland continues 
its efforts to actively curb the illicit spread of small arms and light weapons 
?SALW? and to minimise the human rights and security problems caused by 
SALW.
Finland also actively participates in processes related to the development of 
international humanitarian law.
Finland participates in the development of international export control 
arrangements. Finland complies in its export controls with E? regulations and 
criteria provided by the E? Common Position, which Finland aims to improve 
and strengthen. Arms exports are forbidden in a situation in which there is 
ample reason to believe that they will be used in human rights violations.
4.5 Advancing security in Finland’s neighbourhood  
Finland also fully utilises the opportunities of the intensifying ?ordic cooperation 
in security and defence policy.
Finland improves its bilateral cooperation with the Baltic states, in the E? 
and other international fora. Finland supports closer cooperation between the 
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?ordic countries and Baltic states and promotes collaboration in the Baltic Sea 
area as regards the economy, environmental protection, border control and 
border management cooperation as well as maritime safety and transboundary 
crime prevention. The aforementioned cooperation is being developed within 
the framework of the E? as well as regionally and bilaterally. 
Alongside sector?speci?c action the Council of the Baltic Sea States plays a 
central role as an intergovernmental policy cooperation forum. Finland advocates 
the effective implementation of the E? Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region and 
the earmarking of suf?cient funding for it. Finland supports improvements 
in the marine environment of the Baltic Sea through the Baltic Sea Action 
process and within the framework of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection 
Commission ?HELC?M?. Finland actively participates in the implementation 
of the E?’s Integrated Maritime Policy with the aim of improving the marine 
environment of the Baltic Sea.
The Government will establish how the special status of the Åland Islands will 
be taken into consideration during potential oil spills and other crises, and how 
to ensure the appropriate authorities’ suf?cient preparedness.
Arctic cooperation is being improved in the Arctic Council, the Barents Euro?
Arctic Council and the ?ordic Council of Ministers, as well as other venues. 
Finland supports the strengthening of the Arctic Council as an organisation. 
Regarding the use of natural resources Finland aims to contribute to the 
peaceful settlement of disputes under international law. Finland advances a 
more vigorous E? Arctic policy and an observer status for the E? in the Arctic 
Council. 
Finland considers it important to improve the ?ow of information and 
transparency regarding accident risks related to nuclear power plants, nuclear 
submarines and tactical nuclear weapons in Finland’s near environs.
?n the basis of reciprocity Finland promotes the free movement of persons 
between Finland and Russia, and supports the E?’s goals in advancing visa?
free travel in accordance with the terms and conditions agreed between the 
E? and Russia. For the purpose of managing the increasing border traf?c it is 
important to establish the E?’s and national technical systems early enough 
for visa?free travel.
89
4.6 Security solidarity 
The Solidarity Clause included in the Treaty of Lisbon (terrorist strikes, disasters)
Finland prepares to act in accordance with the solidarity clause ?TFE? Art ????, 
and develops and maintains the necessary preparedness to provide and receive 
the assistance included in the solidarity clause. Finland will see to it that there 
are no national legislative impediments to the implementation of the solidarity 
clause in Finnish territory or for Finland’s action, should another Member State 
become the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man?made 
disaster and ask for assistance. This will require changes in Finnish legislation. 
The goal is to determine the need for legislative review during the term of 
of?ce of this Government. Moreover, Finland will make certain that suf?cient 
resources are earmarked for the implementation of the clause. Finland actively 
participates in the debate on the implementation of the solidarity clause and 
advocates the creation of rules required by the implementation of the solidarity 
clause in the Lisbon Treaty.
Finland considers it important that the E? Member States develop their 
capabilities in providing and receiving assistance in accordance with the clause.
Finland also believes that the existing assistance mechanisms should be more 
effectively utilised. There are already mechanisms that facilitate cooperation 
between Member States such as bilateral and multilateral treaty arrangements, 
rapid alert systems and assistance arrangements at ?nion level as well as 
judicial and executive assistance mechanisms. 
Finland regards it as important that, in accordance with the ???? ?ordic 
declaration on solidarity, the ?ordic countries also further develop their 
capabilities to provide assistance to each other following terrorist attacks, 
natural disasters or cyber attacks.
Special provisions to the Common Security and Defence Policy  
of the Lisbon Treaty: the Mutual Assistance Clause (armed attack)
Finland regards that the mutual assistance clause included in the Treaty of 
Lisbon ?TE? Art ?????? should be interpreted so that it also demands the 
preparedness to provide assistance should one Member State become the 
victim of armed attack. Invoking the obligation does not require a decision 
at ?nion level. The clause does not grant competences to the ?nion. Each 
Member State will individually take a decision as regards the provision of, and 
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forms of, assistance. The E?’s Member States who are also ?AT? members will 
implement their national defence within the framework of the Alliance. 
The E? Member States have not discussed the implementation of the mutual 
assistance obligation. Finland will improve its capacity to provide and receive 
assistance and, during the present Government’s term in of?ce, aim to 
determine the needs to review its legislation so as to enable the implementation 
of the clause.
In its own policy Finland takes into account the fact that the ?nion does not 
have any defence planning of its own, nor common defence arrangements. 
Finland advocates the development of the common security and defence 
policy, which will facilitate the ability to receive and provide assistance.
The EU’s Solidarity Clause 
“(TFEU Art 222) “1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity 
if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made 
disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military 
resources made available by the Member States, to:
(a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States;
– protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack;
– assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event 
of a terrorist attack;
(b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event 
of a natural or man-made disaster.
2. Should a Member State be the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-
made disaster, the other Member States shall assist it at the request of its political authorities. 
To that end, the Member States shall coordinate between themselves in the Council.
3. The arrangements for the implementation by the Union of the solidarity clause shall be 
deﬁned by a decision adopted by the Council acting on a joint proposal by the Commission 
and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Council 
shall act in accordance with Article 31(1) of the Treaty on European Union where this decision 
has defence implications. The European Parliament shall be informed.
For the purposes of this paragraph and without prejudice to Article 240, the Council shall be 
assisted by the Political and Security Committee with the support of the structures developed 
in the context of the common security and defence policy and by the Committee referred to 
in Article 71; the two committees shall, if necessary, submit joint opinions.
4. The European Council shall regularly assess the threats facing the Union in order to enable 
the Union and its Member States to take effective action.”
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The EU’s Mutual Assistance Clause 
“(TEU Art 42(7)) “If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the 
other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the 
means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall 
not prejudice the speciﬁc character of the security and defence policy of certain Member 
States.
Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains 
the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.”
4.7 Securing the functioning of society – comprehensive security
Increasing international interaction and interdependence bring more 
prosperity and bene?ts to Finns. The success of society will continue to be 
built on transparency and extensive civil liberties and rights, while at the same 
time ensuring suf?cient government controls and emergency management 
capacities. These are the underlying premises of Finland’s security and defence 
policy, which also include the consideration of society’s preparedness. 
Finland has a well?functioning, trusted by its citizens, tradition of preparedness. 
For decades this has established the basis for cooperative arrangements between 
the different actors of society. Comprehensive security has been developed in 
concert with the authorities, the business community and organisations. Each 
actor aims to further develop the cooperation. It is increasingly important to 
engage citizens in security?related activities and to improve their competences. 
Society’s preparedness for emergency conditions and serious disruptions is 
built on the comprehensive concept of security and the subsequent Security 
Strategy for Society ?Government Resolution, ?????. Future challenges demand 
a comprehensive and networked approach as well as strategic agility vis???vis 
the changes in the operating environment. The Security Strategy for Society, 
which is built on these premises, covers both internal and external threats – 
without distinction – and provides a common baseline for contingency planning, 
division of responsibilities and the implementation of action.
The preparedness of Finnish society materialises under the comprehensive 
concept of security, which means that society’s vital functions are secured 
through collaboration between the authorities, the business community, 
organisations and citizens.
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The Security Strategy for Society de?nes the comprehensive concept of security, 
and the duties of the administrative branches are given in the Government 
Resolution on the Strategy for Security in Society. The Strategy consolidates 
the comprehensive concept of security as the common concept and model 
of preparedness. In addition, it transforms the present Security and Defence 
Committee into a more wide?ranging and broad?based Security Committee. The 
Committee assists the Government and ministries in comprehensive security 
preparedness and in its coordination. It monitors and analyses the impacts 
of the changes in Finland’s security and defence policy environment, and 
society in general, on comprehensive security arrangements. The Committee 
also monitors the action of different administrative branches and levels of 
administration as regards the maintenance and development of comprehensive 
security arrangements. If necessary, the Security Committee also coordinates 
large and important contingency?related issues, such as the harmonisation of 
preparedness at the state level, the development of collaborative models, modi 
operandi, research and improvements in training.
The Government Security and Defence Policy Report is the central steering 
document that extends beyond several Government terms and, as per 
the comprehensive concept of security, lays down the key guidelines for 
comprehensive security. The principles of implementing the comprehensive 
concept of security are explained in the Government Resolution on the 
Strategy for Security in Society. The concrete guidelines for its implementation 
are given in the Government Programme, Government decisions, the 
competent administrative branches’ operating and ?nancial plans, and other 
strategy documents such as the Government Decision on the ?bjectives of 
Security of Supply, the Internal Security Programme and the Action Plan on 
?ational Information Security Strategy. The authorities, working together with 
the business community and organisations, are responsible for the practical 
implementation. 
4.8 Guidelines for developing the implementation  
 of comprehensive security
The changes in the Report’s operating environment and in the possible use 
of force have diverse effects on the manner in which society’s functions are 
secured. When it comes to comprehensive security the key challenge relates to 
the growing interdependence between global and national systems. Systems’ 
operating logics often fail to comply with the control attempts of administrative 
sectors or markets. While increasingly high?speed communications intensify 
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cooperation between security operators, they also make it ever more dif?cult 
to curb the spread of incorrect information or malware.
The business community is increasingly important in securing the vital 
functions of society. The contingency plans of large companies and critical 
service providers are an important part of comprehensive security. Issues 
related to security of supply, service agreements and other cooperation with 
the authorities require increased availability and awareness of legislation and 
contractual and application guides. The key players of the business community 
must be utilised at all collaborative fora of security development.
As a result of the changes in the operating environment it is all the more 
important to be able to more comprehensively identify and analyse the 
indirect and immediate interrelationships of threats. The coordination of 
multidimensional skills at all levels of the administration is essential so as 
to improve comprehensive security and optimise resources. Comprehensive 
security?thinking, emerging from collaboration, also supports the discovery of 
anticipatory action and cost?effective solutions.
The central role of the European Union in preserving the comprehensive security 
of society
The E? has competences with regard to several key areas of comprehensive 
security of society. These areas relate to the security and well?being of the 
population and to sustaining the viability of society. Whereas in some areas the 
E?’s competence is exclusive, which means that only the E? enacts legislation 
and signs international treaties in these areas, in other areas the E? shares 
competence with its Member States. Additionally, in certain areas the ?nion 
either implements measures that complement the actions of its Member States, 
or the Member States coordinate their own policies. 
Utilisation of international cooperation
The interdependence of the global security environment as well as threat 
prevention and management require extensive international cooperation 
in foreign and security policy and on a practical level between the security 
authorities. As a part of European and global collaborative structures 
and organisations, one must prepare to prevent and repel wide?ranging, 
transboundary threats and problems. Intersectoral cooperation must be 
intensi?ed due to the nature of crises and threats, and to facilitate the effective 
use of society’s resources. 
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International cooperation associated with internal security also strengthens 
Finland’s foreign policy and national security. ?ey international cooperation 
areas related to internal security include counter?terrorism and organised 
crime, better border management, immigration control, participation in 
international civil emergency preparedness cooperation and other crisis 
assistance. The European ?nion is Finland’s central frame of reference when 
it comes to maintaining and improving security. It is important that Finland 
participate in the development of the E?’s border, maritime, immigration and 
common asylum policies, and in the development of associated European 
facilities. Finland actively participates in the operation of the European border 
management agency FR??TE? and the European Asylum Support ?f?ce. This 
advances border management and immigration control in Europe and the 
capacity of the E?’s neighbours and, consequently, positive development of 
the security environment in the European neighbourhood.
International cooperation in the exchange of information and security research 
is crucial regarding the accurate anticipation of changes in the operating 
environment and responding to threats. The importance of the security of 
information?related agreements which Finland has signed with other states 
and international organisations such as the E?, ?AT? and the ESA ?European 
Space Agency? culminates in the exchange of classi?ed information. This, 
for its part, increases the need for Finland to secure the preconditions of its 
national security authorities ??ational Security Authority ?SA – Designated 
Security Authority DSA? in all situations.
The development of security expertise
The comprehensive nature of security and the interdependence of its many 
branches demand research and development which, especially, supports 
practical action. Research guidance and cooperation between universities, 
research institutes, the security sector’s educational establishments and other 
actors involved in security research or funding must be further improved. The 
utilisation of the results of research and the development of preparedness 
must be more systematic. For example, operational environment analysis, an 
intersectoral research programme, will eventually support the drafting of future 
reports and other studies. These matters must be taken into consideration 
when the ?ational Security Research Strategy is updated into a security 
research action plan in ????. Comprehensive security research themes must 
be considered as an entirety, encompassing the vital functions of society, 
developments in the operating environment and trend assessments. Guidance 
will be provided by the respective administrative branches’ research units, 
supported by the future Security Committee.
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The development of security expertise is important from the standpoint of 
society’s comprehensive security. The citizens’ security preparedness must be 
enhanced by improving the access to information as well as the quality of 
instructions. ?rganisations play a central role in this process and the authorities 
must support them. While the citizens’ skills are being improved, the process 
must simultaneously aim to improve communality and prevent social exclusion. 
Professionals in the security sector, be they in the public sector, the business 
community or the private sector, must be able to evaluate threats and their 
possible consequences in a wider context than that of their own.
Improving situation awareness and communications 
The national ability to compile and maintain a comprehensive situation picture 
on the vital functions of society, and to analyse and manage activities during 
disruptions and emergency conditions demands further improvement. When it 
comes to developing comprehensive security and disturbance management, the 
importance of situation awareness cuts across all levels of the administration 
and society. The Government situation awareness activities are being reformed, 
and the development of situation picture dissemination and comprehensive 
situation awareness coordination is being further advanced by drafting a 
national risk analysis on the basis of the threat scenarios given in the Security 
Strategy for Society.
Crisis communications will be further improved and strategic communications 
will be harmonised between the state leadership and administrative branches. 
The goal is to provide prognostic and coordinated communications during 
various crises. Communications constitute an elemental part of the effectiveness 
of leadership and management, and different perspectives must be taken into 
consideration in all plans and exercises related to comprehensive security.
Making exercises more methodical 
Good preparedness in preventing and repelling threats and managing their 
consequences calls for systematic exercises. Exercises that test society’s 
crisis preparedness and the methods of evaluating the implementation of 
strategies must continually be improved. The state leadership’s preparedness 
exercise VALHA is organised once every four years during the ?rst half of every 
Government’s term of of?ce. Maintaining and developing the preparedness of 
administrative branches and sectors requires a systematic development and 
testing system. The administrative branches must draw up plans for developing 
the functions that the preparedness concepts included in their strategic tasks 
entail.
96
Advancing the security of municipalities and regions
Municipalities organise welfare and security services at the local level. 
Municipalities have a central role in preparedness because they are responsible 
for setting up basic services and several other functions vital to society. It 
is not practicable to establish all?embracing security expertise in every 
municipality. Cooperation between the municipalities, supported by the 
regional administration, must be improved. Existing regional security networks 
must be utilised in regional development. Municipalities must see to it that 
they themselves, their cooperative structures and private service providers are 
prepared for disruptions, and that they have up?to?date and tested contingency 
and continuity management plans. 
?rganisations and the business community closely participate in continuity 
management planning. Preparedness and continuity management perspectives 
must be taken into consideration when the service structure of social and health 
services is being created, so that new structures and service areas support 
intersectoral cooperation and continuity management. Municipalities’ access 
to national and regional assistance will be improved, especially with regard 
to rapidly escalating and widespread disruptions. The respective boundaries 
of the state’s regional actors and municipalities’ collaborative sectors will 
be synchronised. Along with the past and present changes of the different 
authorities’ regional division of duties it is important to make certain that the 
roles and responsibilities related to security remain clear.
Security of supply and continuity management
Security of supply is playing an ever more important role in the development 
of society’s comprehensive security because the private sector has taken 
over an increasingly large share of society’s vital functions. ?ew ownership 
arrangements and business structures as well as international dependences 
brought on by globalisation pose challenges to security of supply.
Government Resolutions on the ?bjectives of Security of Supply steer the 
activities related to security of supply. The basic goal of security of supply 
has been to sustain the livelihood and functioning of the population as well 
as critical infrastructure and production during serious disruptions in normal 
conditions, and in emergency conditions.
The present Government Resolution on Security of Supply will be updated 
by the spring of ????. Since the economic environment and threat scenarios 
have changed, the revised Resolution will be built on an extensive analysis 
of trends, risks and threats in the operating environment, including their 
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impact on security of supply. The Government Resolution on the ?bjectives 
of Security of Supply will determine the focus areas for the coming years 
and take into account the challenges brought on by the networked society’s 
interdependences, from both national and international perspectives.
In order to guarantee the basic goals of security of supply, continuity 
management, including organisational safety, will be developed particularly 
with regard to the critical actors in the security of supply?chain.
Security of Supply
Security of supply refers to the capability of sustaining such basic economic functions of 
society which are vital to the livelihood of the population, the viability and security of society 
and securing the material preconditions of national defence during serious disruptions and 
emergency conditions. The National Emergency Supply Agency, a public body, is responsible 
for the tasks related to the coordination, development, and maintenance of security of supply.
Security of supply relies on functioning markets and a competitive economy. Nonetheless, 
markets alone will not necessarily sustain society’s economic and technological basic 
functions during various disruptions and emergency conditions. Hence, preparations to sustain 
the vital functions of society are done through different security of supply-measures even in 
emergency conditions. The instruments include emergency stockpiling of critical products, 
legislation on preparedness as well as ﬁnancial and economic policy, international security 
of supply-cooperation, and voluntary continuity management planning and preparedness in 
critical companies and organisations.
Finland’s emergency preparedness is built on the solid tradition of cooperation between 
the central government and the business community. Security of supply-related activities 
are organised as a comprehensive collaborative network which ﬂexibly and cost-effectively 
develops society’s crisis resilience through voluntary public-private partnerships.
National cyber security
Cyber threats pose a wide?ranging and serious challenge to comprehensive 
security. Cyber threats have become more dangerous to society in general. In 
addition to information security violations and cybercrime, cyber attacks can 
be used as a means of political and economic pressure: in a serious crisis they 
can be employed as an instrument of in?uence alongside traditional means of 
military force. 
Finland’s cyber response capability is closely connected with international 
cooperation. Cyber security, including its ancillary tasks, provides an example 
of a comprehensive security challenge affecting all administrative branches. In 
addition to networked cooperation the compilation of a cyber security picture 
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along with continuous forecasting and analysis require centralised solutions 
such as the Government Situation Centre and the Cyber Security Centre.
The national Cyber Security Strategy, to be completed in early ????, lays the 
foundation for cyber security arrangements in Finland. The Strategy extensively 
utilises the expertise of society’s security actors, especially that of the business 
community. The guidelines of the Cyber Security Strategy will be put into 
practice through an action plan which will be drafted in ????.
Securing the capacity of security authorities
The capacity of the security authorities must be maintained in all situations. 
All threat scenarios must include extensive preparedness. The support 
society gives to comprehensive security and national defence requires ever 
more intensive networking. Reliance on society’s security of supply and, 
subsequently, on production that supports the military defence and security 
as well as system maintenance, keeps growing. Due to the interdependence 
of national and international security the tasks of the Defence Forces, i.e. 
the military defence of Finland, interauthority cooperation and international 
military crisis management will be more intertwined in the future.
While Finland prepares to defend itself, it must also be able to protect 
the population and secure the viability of society. In accordance with the 
Government Programme a separate report will assess the need to build more 
civil defence shelters.
5 Developing Finland’s defence
5.1 Defence policy
Defence policy measures advance Finland’s security, support national foreign 
and security policy decision?making and create the preconditions for the 
maintenance and development of the defence capability. Having an active 
defence policy guarantees a wide range of instruments available to the state 
leadership and supports the realisation of Finland’s foreign and security policy 
goals.
The key objectives of Finland’s defence development are the maintenance 
of a defence capability tailored to our security environment and resources, 
defence development as part of comprehensive security and the intensi?cation 
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of multinational defence cooperation, which also serves the goals of Finland’s 
crisis management participation. 
In the desired end state, in the ????s Finland will have the capability, 
respected by the state leadership and others, to defend the country and 
its independence, sustain the livelihood of its citizens and, in concert with 
international actors, manage security threats. Finland advances its security 
by maintaining capable defence forces in accordance with the comprehensive 
concept of security, by participating in crisis management and through active 
international cooperation. 
The primary objective of the defence capability is to establish deterrence 
against the use of military force and the threat thereof. Should Finland become 
the victim of armed aggression the vital functions of society will be protected 
and the attack will be repelled. 
Preparedness against the use of military force, or the threat thereof, requires 
such military capabilities which raise the threshold against the use of force 
on Finland and make any military action ineffective. In normal conditions the 
capabilities needed for territorial surveillance and the protection of territorial 
integrity are emphasised.
Foreign actors continually evaluate Finland’s defence capability and its 
development. The assessments of our deterrence comprise a number of 
factors. At the political and societal level the evaluation includes political 
and economic stability, the decision?making capability, resources allocated 
to defence, the will to defend the country, and the scope and depth of our 
international cooperation. The military assessment focuses on the entirety 
of our military capabilities. The key factors include command and control, 
intelligence, surveillance and logistics systems, as well as the readiness and 
mobilisation capability, the level of training and equipment, the capabilities of 
the units and weapon systems and the skills of the personnel. In particular, 
the most capable and rapidly deployable troops and weapon systems are able 
to raise the threshold against the use of force and, if necessary, begin to repel 
an attack.
As a militarily non?aligned country Finland prepares to repel military threats 
without outside assistance. Consequently, it maintains all capability areas of 
the defence system. The nucleus of Finland’s defence is the military defence 
capability generated by the Defence Forces. The Finnish Defence Forces must 
retain control over all of the critical capabilities of the military defence system. 
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Military defence is a part of society’s comprehensive security. Crises increasingly 
affect all sectors of society, and it is dif?cult to limit them. While the growing 
interdependence increases risks and the vulnerability of society, it also enables 
the bene?ts that can be obtained through intensifying cooperation. 
Securing the vital functions of society, crisis resilience and security of supply as 
well as guaranteeing critical competence are pivotal factors which also affect 
defence. Society’s support is critical to the implementation of defence during 
a crisis, just as the support of the Defence Forces is valuable to securing 
the effectiveness of the civilian authorities’ activities. It will be increasingly 
challenging to allocate society’s resources to protracted, wide?ranging defence 
activities in the future. The private sector has taken over an ever?growing 
share and responsibility of society’s critical resources and vital functions. In 
order to meet the requirements of emergency conditions, cooperation with 
strategic and other partners, government authorities, businesses and ?G?s is 
being intensi?ed. Partnership is a feature of managing wartime capabilities and 
life cycle costs as well as the cost?effectiveness of the defence.
Multinational defence cooperation strengthens the defence capability and 
ensures the development of military capabilities. In the most important areas 
cooperation can be achieved via several venues by avoiding unnecessary 
duplication. By participating in defence cooperation Finland can also in?uence 
its content and structures. It is particularly important for Finland to maximise 
its in?uence so as to be able to add in the special requirements arising from our 
defence solution. Interaction within international structures and organisations, 
for its part, improves our situation awareness and the ability to pre?emptively 
in?uence crisis resolution in the regions of their origin.
Active defence cooperation improves Finland’s deterrence. While the cooperation 
does not provide any security guarantees, it facilitates the reception of political, 
military and other assistance should Finland’s resources prove inadequate. In 
return, Finland must be ready and able to provide military and other assistance 
to others when required. 
Cooperation takes place under the auspices of the E? and ?AT? partnership, 
in regional groups and bilaterally. The E? and ?AT? play supportive roles in 
multinational projects. Tangible collaboration between willing partners occurs 
in country groupings, of which the most important from Finland’s perspective 
is the ?ordic defence cooperation arrangement ??RDEFC?. ?ther important 
cooperation partners for Finland are especially the ?nited States and the 
countries in ?orthern Europe. Cooperation promotes military interoperability, 
the creation and development of capabilities, and strengthens our faculty for 
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international crisis management participation. ?AT? standards and procedures 
are the mainstay of interoperability.
?ordic defence cooperation has signi?cantly intensi?ed in recent years. ?ordic 
cooperation attempts to achieve synergies while aiming to gain operational, 
economic, technical and industrial added value. This collaboration also strives 
for interoperability which would facilitate intensi?ed and more wide?ranging 
cooperation to supplement national defence solutions and capabilities. ?ordic 
cooperation areas are the following: defence policy, strategic development, 
capabilities, human resources and education, training and exercises, and 
operations. The ?ordic countries are, politically and militarily, deeply committed 
to the development and intensi?cation of defence cooperation. Finland is an 
active participant in this process.
Multinational exercises and international rapid response force pools will become 
increasingly important as vehicles for maintaining and improving interoperability. 
The Defence Forces develop their capabilities and interoperability, especially 
by participating in the E?’s battle groups and in activities supplementing the 
?AT? Response Force ??RF?, and associated exercises.
Participation in military crisis management strengthens Finland’s defence 
capability. The goal of preparation and implementation is to guarantee the 
effectiveness of the participation. The quantitative and qualitative goals of 
operational participation are set on a case?by?case basis. 
5.2 Using and developing the defence system 
Finland demonstrates its defence capability through territorial surveillance and 
by protecting its territorial integrity, through national training and exercises, 
through participation in military crisis management, and through a strong will 
to defend the country.
Finland’s defence underscores good situation awareness and command and 
control capability, joint effects and the ability to exploit the strengths of its 
own territory. Defence readiness is regulated to correspond to the prevailing 
security environment.
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How will the defence system meet the requirements of the operating  
environment?
The requirements of the operating environment will be met by:
 ? Generating comprehensive situation awareness and a situation picture,
 ? Maintaining an early-warning capability,
 ? Maintaining continuous decision-making and command and control readiness, and a robust 
C4 system, 
 ? Maintaining a ﬂexible readiness control capability, 
 ? Maintaining the appropriate capability for territorial surveillance and the protection of 
territorial integrity,
 ? Maintaining the suitable mission-oriented capabilities of operational, regional and local 
troops,
 ? Developing and maintaining the most efﬁcient units and weapon systems capable of rapid 
response,
 ? Securing an appropriately self-sufﬁcient and centralised logistics system, 
 ? Guaranteeing the mobility of military force in the entire territory of the nation,
 ? Securing the collaboration capability between different authorities and other actors in 
society,
 ? Ensuring international interoperability and compatibility 
 ? Improving the capability to participate in military crisis management.
In ???5 the wartime strength of the Defence Forces will be approximately 
??? ??? troops. The aim is to have more capable units and weapon systems 
in order to compensate for the reduction in troop strengths. The formation of 
regional troops alongside operational and territorial units will bolster the local 
defence capability. 
Defence development will be built on the long?term policies adopted over 
the past two decades and investments in weapon systems, know?how and 
infrastructure, among other things. The focus has been on defence readiness 
and the capability to prevent and repel a strategic strike. Furthermore, a 
defence capability suf?cient to repel any armed aggression aimed at seizing 
territory has been maintained and the preparedness to participate in military 
crisis management missions has been improved. Troop performance has been 
maintained and developed through better skills and training as well as materiel 
acquisitions. 
The command and control system creates the preconditions for managing and 
using the defence system at the different levels of hierarchy. The development 
of operational command and control will lead towards an integrated system, 
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and the system’s robustness and usability will be improved. The development 
will take into account the requirements of network?centric warfare. The 
Defence Forces’ cyber capabilities will be created as part of the Defence Forces’ 
command and control system and society’s comprehensive security.
The intelligence and surveillance system generates a situation picture and an 
analysis in all readiness conditions. These generate situation awareness and 
early?warning, and support the selection of desirable targets. The development 
of the system must ensure the creation of a sound entity that comprises 
intelligence, surveillance and battle?eld targeting support.  
The logistics system is an elemental part of the military defence. It comprises 
defence logistics as well as society’s logistic components and functions, i.e. 
strategic partnerships and outsourced services. The logistics system must be 
viable in national and international settings. The focus of its development is on 
the capability to support the military services’ operational troops. 
The Defence Forces’ regular personnel and the most rapidly deployable 
wartime troops will be used in responding to military pressure. They also raise 
the threshold against the use of force and, if necessary, will be used in the 
initial phases of repelling an attack. The defence system will be used to deny 
the adversary’s freedom of action, break down his order of battle, repel his 
attacks and protect important targets.
The Defence Forces’ troops and systems create the defence capability. 
?perations in which the most capable troops and systems participate create 
the centre of gravity for defence and the preconditions for the decisive battles. 
Long?range standoff weapon systems support the operations. Information 
operations, consisting of cyber operations, electronic warfare and psychological 
operations are executed during all stages of a crisis. The creation of the defence 
system’s most important capabilities will be secured. Development focuses on 
the functioning and robustness of intelligence, surveillance and C? systems, as 
well as interoperability, the range and speed of ?re, troop mobility and force 
protection. Development must also take into account the capability to receive 
assistance from abroad. 
The Army is the most important service in active defence and decisive battles. 
Ground defence will hold up and gradually wear down the adversary, retain 
control over key military areas, repel attacks, protect society’s vital functions 
and targets and, ultimately, defeat the aggressor.
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The capability of the Army’s operational troops to ?ght decisive battles requires 
the maintenance and development of ?repower, mobility and force protection. 
Heavy rocket artillery, ?eld artillery and countermobility capabilities are the 
key elements of the Army’s effect. The most important territorial units are 
trained to ?ght active defensive battles. They will be used in pinning down 
and weakening the aggressor, repelling attacks and retaining control over 
important strategic points. In accordance with the new battle tactics the Army 
troops will operate actively and ?exibly, and will be capable of dispersed action. 
At ?rst the Army will focus on developing its territorial troops. As of ???? the 
emphasis will shift to operational troops.
Local defence will be strengthened by the introduction of regional units. 
Among other things, regional troops will be used locally in combat tasks, target 
protection and surveillance functions, in mobilising other units, supporting 
territorial and operational troops, maintaining contact with the authorities 
and in assisting them. Regional troops also help associate voluntary defence 
activities with the Defence Forces and comprehensive security. The composition 
and materiel of regional units will be tailored to suit their tasks and their area 
of operations. ?nits will incorporate suitable functions related to voluntary 
defence and comprehensive security. 
Maritime defence focuses on maritime surveillance, safeguarding the vital sea 
lines of communication and repelling naval attacks. Missile and mine warfare 
are the mainstay of the ?avy’s effect. The vessels of the naval combat units 
must be maintained and improved so as to be able to safeguard the vital 
sea lines of communication and deny the adversary his freedom of operation 
in key areas. The night?vision capabilities and mobility of amphibious and 
coastal units will be improved so that they can successfully implement coastal 
surveillance and coastal defence. 
Air defence focuses on air surveillance, protecting nationally important targets 
and repelling air attacks. Fighter aircraft and anti?aircraft missile units form the 
framework of the air defence system. The development of an air?to?ground 
capability will continue while maintaining the performance of ?ghter defence. 
The life cycle of the present F??? ?ghter aircraft will be utilised as cost?
effectively as possible into the late ????s. The air defence of important targets 
and troops will be improved by ground?based air defence system acquisitions. 
The Finnish Border Guard, an integral element of the defence system, 
participate in the defence of the nation. The Border Guard’s defence plans and 
preparations, related to the defence of the nation, are implemented in close 
cooperation with the Defence Forces. Should defence readiness so require, 
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Border Guard units, or parts thereof, can be seconded to the Defence Forces 
as an element of the military defence system.
The Defence Forces prepare to support other authorities on the basis of their 
requests for executive assistance, or in accordance with jointly implemented 
contingency plans. Preparedness is built on common planning and exercises. 
The support can include military capabilities which the other authorities do not 
then need to acquire, so as to avoid unnecessary duplication. In practice these 
can include niche capabilities, special equipment and materiel, personnel, 
logistics or command and control systems, among other things. Some of 
the Defence Forces’ capabilities are readily available in normal conditions. 
These include assets such as helicopters, aircraft, ships, executive assistance 
detachments, special forces, ?rst responders and other niche capabilities ?e.g. 
CBR?: chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear?. The usability of these 
capabilities is ensured through investments in suf?cient personnel, know?how 
and materiel.
All of the services’ units can be used in military crisis management tasks. First 
and foremost, units having undergone troop production and evaluation will be 
deployed to crisis management missions. In accordance with E?BG and ?AT? 
Response Force classi?cations, the units participating in crisis management are 
divided into rapid response and lower readiness units, and niche capabilities. 
A versatile crisis management troop register best enables comprehensive crisis 
management participation, allowing for ?exible decision?making.
Military crisis management capabilities are also prepared to be used in support 
of other crisis management actors. The support may include things such as 
materiel, logistics and expert assistance as well as the exchange of a situation 
picture. Along with military crisis management operations the Defence Forces 
must have the readiness to provide expert assistance as well as training and 
support associated with security sector reform. The lessons learned from the 
latest operations in Afghanistan, Chad and the Horn of Africa are taken into 
consideration in capability development.
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The Finnish Defence Forces’ key wartime units
2008 After 2015
Army
Readiness Brigade 3 Readiness Brigade 3
Mechanised battle group 2 Mechanised battle group 2
Jaeger brigade 2 Jaeger brigade 0
Regional brigade 6 Infantry brigade (regional) 3
Special Jaeger battalion 1 Special Jaeger battalion 1
Helicopter battalion 1 Helicopter battalion 1
Navy
Missile fast attack craft (FAC) and 
mine countermeasures squadrons
5 Battle group (ﬂeet) 2
Naval Command (unit) 5 Battle group (coastal) 3
Coastal Jaeger Battalion 2 Battle group (coastal Jaeger) 1
Air Force
Fighter squadron 3 Fighter squadron 3
Main operating base 6 Main operating base 4
Joint capabilities
?? Command and control
?? Intelligence and surveillance
?? Logistics 
Joint capabilities
?? Integrated command and control
?? Integrated intelligence and surveillance
?? A-G capability
?? Joint logistics
 
Total wartime strength in 2015 approximately 230 000 troops.
5.3 Defence Forces Reform and the Defence Forces’  
 peacetime organisation in 2015 
The Finnish Defence Forces will implement a reform by the year ???5. The 
reform is a precondition for the capacity and further development of the 
Defence Forces as the defence for the ????s is being built. 
During the past two decades the Defence Forces’ command and administrative 
structures have undergone several reforms. The need for a more thoroughgoing 
reform was already identi?ed before the present challenging situation in the 
state economy. ?ey causes for the transformation include the rising operational 
costs, defence materiel becoming obsolete and smaller age groups in national 
service. Internal cost pressures and the in?exible structure of the budget 
have resulted in a signi?cant reduction in the level of activities and cuts in 
procurements. The saving targets in the ????????? decisions on spending 
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limits make the reform all the more urgent and, therefore, signi?cant cuts have 
been instituted to the level of activities and acquisitions.
The key goals of the reform include both restoring the volume of training 
and exercises to a level which corresponds to the training requirements and 
safeguarding the necessary investments in materiel. The reform centralises 
the Defence Forces’ intelligence, logistics and support functions as well as 
research and planning. The number of personnel will be reduced and wartime 
troop strengths will decrease. At the same time unnecessary premises will be 
closed. The Defence Forces’ peacetime command structure will be changed 
into a three?tier arrangement by abolishing the regional commands and their 
headquarters. The number and structure of units that train conscripts will 
be adjusted to coincide with the diminishing age group and wartime force 
generation needs.
In administrative matters the Defence Forces are subordinate to the Ministry 
of Defence. The Defence Command is a central government agency and 
the supreme headquarters of the Defence Forces. It is also the command 
headquarters of the Chief of Defence. The Defence Command has the capability 
to lead defence planning and development, and the creation, maintenance 
and use of the defence capability. The Defence Command’s subordinate 
establishments are the Defence Forces C? Agency, the Defence Forces Service 
Centre, the Defence Forces Military Intelligence Centre, the Defence Forces 
Technical Research Centre and the Defence Forces Logistics Establishment. 
The ?ational Defence ?niversity organises the Defence Forces’ international 
courses.
Despite the reorganisation, the Defence Forces will retain their presence 
in different parts of the country. Cooperation with the authorities and the 
continuance of voluntary defence activities during the reform will be ensured 
through military units and the network of regional of?ces. The regional 
of?ces are part of Army units and are subordinate to the Army Command in 
administrative matters.
The Government continues to assess the handling of military command matters. 
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Defence Forces Reform    
 2011 2015
Military defence appropriations EUR 2.45 bn EUR 2.22 bn
Wartime strength ca. 350 000 ca. 230 000
Peacetime personnel ca. 14 500* ca. 12 300
Size of age group in national service ca. 27 000/year ca. 25 000/year
Reservists in training ca. 25 000/year ca. 18 000/year
Tiers in command structure 4 3
Number of administrative units 51 32
Number of training units 25 16
*1 Jan 2012
Factbox: Defence Forces’ peacetime organisation, page 117
5.4 Creating and maintaining the defence capability
The basic structure of defence encompasses suf?cient and competent 
personnel, a suf?cient amount of suitable and modern material, appropriate 
infrastructure and security of supply. 
Personnel and their competence
The goal of human resources management is to secure professional, competent 
and motivated personnel for the Defence Forces. In ???5 the peacetime 
strength of the Defence Forces will be approximately ?? ??? persons.
The defence solution requires that wartime units have enough ?t and able 
professional military personnel serving as wartime leaders, as leaders of 
technologically advanced weapon and command systems and as maintenance 
experts. The viability of the military pension system will be ensured in such a 
manner that regular personnel can end their active service at the correct time 
from the perspective of a leadership reserve, and so that their time of service 
supports the creation of the reserve. 
The defence establishment must be able to handle the development of special 
features related to the status, skills requirements and abilities of personnel. 
These include the obligation to transfer to another post, the military pension 
system as well as a person’s mental state and physical ?tness. 
Personnel transfers and moves to new locations will temporarily increase during 
the implementation of the Defence Forces Reform and the duties of personnel 
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are being altered in a fashion that promotes performance. The obligation to 
transfer to another post will require supportive action in the future as well.
International assignments are a positive thing from the perspective of defence 
performance, personal expertise and an individual’s career advancement. The 
development of support services and other similar services provided during 
and after assignments to military crisis management missions will continue.
The viability of general conscription will be improved by guaranteeing the 
preconditions of training units. Each training platoon will have ?.5 instructors 
on average.
The different sectors of society must tackle and prevent the causes of military 
service interruptions as well as try to in?uence the education and well?being 
of persons who have not completed military service. The call?up system will 
be developed by intensifying cooperation between the Defence Forces and the 
other authorities. 
The conscripts’ economic, societal and social status will be enhanced so as to 
improve their motivation to serve in the military and guarantee the viability of 
general conscription. Special attention will be paid to giving credits for military 
service as regards studies and different tasks of society. ?et another goal is 
to better utilise the conscripts’ civilian skills. The development of conscription 
will continue on the basis of the recommendations included in the ???? report 
titled ‘Finnish conscription’.
The reserves are an indispensable asset to wartime units. Critical tasks in the 
Defence Forces’ crisis organisation and the proper use of the reservists’ skills 
in the Defence Forces’ different tasks are highlighted in the development of 
the role of the reserve. 
Individual and unit?level training and exercises are a central part of creating 
and maintaining capability. In order to ensure adequate skills for the key troops 
and units, suf?cient ?eld exercises, ?avy vessels’ sea days and ?ight hours that 
meet the training requirements must be guaranteed. This is also essential 
from the standpoint of health and safety. As of ???5, in line with the Defence 
Forces Reform, the number of refresher exercises will be returned to the level 
that meets the demands of emergency conditions. The goal is to annually train 
approximately ?? ??? reservists, which will proportionally represent the level 
that existed before the Defence Forces Reform.
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Voluntary defence supports the preservation of a capable reserve and the 
readiness to assist other authorities. Voluntary defence activities are developed 
to better serve the needs of the Defence Forces. The know?how of voluntary 
defence organisations and the reserve will be utilised in regional troop planning. 
General national defence instruction will be conducted on ?ational Defence 
Courses and Provincial Defence Courses, Advanced and Continuing Education 
Courses, and Special Courses on ?ational Defence. The instruction is carried 
out within the framework of comprehensive security development. ?ational 
defence courses are conducted by the Defence Forces and the provincial 
defence courses by the civilian authorities with the support of the Defence 
Forces. The Defence Forces Reform and the regional administration reform will 
take into account the continuity of provincial defence courses.
The will to defend the country remains the cornerstone of defence. The defence 
will is also vitally important to society’s crisis resilience. Among other things 
the will to defend the country can be safeguarded by high?quality conscript 
and reservist training, improving the viability of general conscription, creating 
regional troops, and supporting voluntary defence activities. 
Materiel 
Investments in materiel constitute an important element in the maintenance 
and development of capabilities. Approximately one third of military defence 
appropriations is allocated to material readiness.
In addition to shrinking resources and ageing materiel the following factors are 
particularly in?uential in material policy decisions: requirements for capabilities 
and cost?effectiveness, rising life cycle costs, military security of supply as well 
as E? legislation on defence and security?related acquisitions. The structures 
of military security of supply must be developed while taking into account 
domestic and foreign actors. The defence establishment will actively develop 
domestic and international cooperation in development of capability and 
security of supply between the authorities and the business community. 
The ability of the domestic defence and security industry to integrate, maintain, 
further develop, service, repair and decommission the Defence Forces’ critical 
materiel will be maintained and developed from the perspective of military 
security of supply. The role of the industry will be assessed vis???vis strategic 
competences and critical technologies. As a rule, support for critical systems 
must be available in Finland. The defence industry’s export efforts and 
internationalisation are actively sponsored.
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The rationale for retaining a substantial domestic gunpowder and ordnance 
manufacturing capability is continually reassessed. For the time being, domestic 
manufacturing has been justi?ed because of security of supply?considerations.
A strategic partner can be responsible for the maintenance and life cycle 
management of critical materiel.  The possibilities of new partnership 
arrangements are being studied in areas outside the Defence Forces’ core 
competences.
The life cycle of the Defence Forces’ existing materiel will be exploited to its 
maximum. Multilateral and bilateral cooperation will be used in procurements. 
The main focus is on operationally mature and tested products. The acquisition 
of surplus materiel from abroad is seen as one instrument in procurements. In 
order to sustain the competence and capacity of the critical domestic defence 
industry, technological research and development will mainly be commissioned 
from domestic sources.
International defence materiel cooperation is implemented within ?ordic 
cooperation, the development of the European defence market, ?AT?’s 
partnership cooperation and bilateral cooperation. International defence 
materiel cooperation is a precondition for cost?effective acquisitions, 
international material compatibility, the capability to receive foreign assistance, 
securing the military security of supply and the Defence Forces’ ability to 
participate in international crisis management operations. ?ordic defence 
materiel cooperation is to be intensi?ed. Its objective is to more concretely 
plan, prepare and implement, in particular, common development projects 
as well as common acquisitions and logistics. The prospects for common 
procurements are actively being evaluated. Interoperability and compatibility 
as per ?AT? standards is a goal in procurements. 
Infrastructure and the environment
The Defence Forces’ real estate mass will be developed from the national 
defence perspective. It must meet the requirements of technological progress 
and it will be integrated into the overall structure of society through land 
use planning. The network of garrisons is maintained at the level required 
by peacetime training and wartime functions. Following the changes in the 
Defence Forces’ activities and those caused by the reform unneeded areas and 
structures will, if possible, be relinquished as entities. An evaluation into the 
entirety of the defence establishment’s premises will be completed by the end 
of ????. This should facilitate a more cost?effective use of the premises. 
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The needs of national defence are taken into account in land use planning in 
accordance with the use purposes of the defence establishment’s real estate 
nationwide.
The points of departure as regards the environment are sustainable 
development, responsibility over the adverse effects of activities, and the 
efforts to prevent them. There are special features in military activities that 
differ from civilian activities. These must be taken into account in the review of 
real estate planning and environmental legislation. 
5.5  Resources for defence development
The maintenance of a defence capability built on long?term planning and 
development requires guidelines from the state leadership that extend 
beyond several Government terms. Despite the economic uncertainty our 
defence capability must continue to meet the requirements of the operating 
environment. The political guidelines related to maintenance and development 
must take into account the capabilities’ entire life cycle. Hence, capability 
planning must extend all the way to the ????s.
The keystones of defence development include the defence of the entire 
territory of the nation as well as the preservation of general conscription and 
military non?alignment. 
The maintenance and development of the defence capability requires a 
balanced approach between appropriations to materiel readiness, operational 
expenses and ?xed personnel expenses. Since the price of defence materiel 
increases more rapidly than other activities, it profoundly impacts the resources 
allocated to military defence. At the same time, the other costs will continue 
to rise as well. The assessment of appropriations must take into consideration 
that a materially suf?cient defence capability also requires a satisfactory level 
in terms of Euros. 
The development guidelines with regard to timetables and volumes, given in 
the ???? Government Report, will not materialise as planned. This is because 
most of the cuts in appropriations had to be targeted on the maintenance and 
development of capabilities, and on day?to?day activities.
Considering the requirements in the maintenance and development of 
capabilities in the ????s an imbalance is about to emerge between the desired 
end state of defence and the available resources, as described in this Report. 
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Consequently, the Defence Forces’ ability to carry out their tasks may fall short 
of the required level. It is important to prepare for the key challenges to the 
defence capability already during the ongoing decade. ?therwise, at the onset 
of the ????s the defence capability will no longer meet the requirements of the 
Defence Forces’ tasks and the operating environment. 
In the short term ?approximately ?ve years? the Defence Forces Reform will 
balance the cost structure and lay the foundation for future development. 
In the medium term, by the beginning of the ????s a substantial share of the 
critical material for all services’ most important troops will become obsolete, 
degrading their capability below the required level. In practice, the materiel 
investment level of ???5 requires strong prioritisation: it will only enable the 
maintenance of a small share of the troops’ capabilities.
In the long term, by the mid?????s the maintenance of maritime defence 
capabilities, and by the late ????s the maintenance of air defence capabilities, 
will become extremely challenging. The guidelines for replacing and ?nancing 
these assets must already be adopted during the next Government’s term 
of of?ce. Furthermore, the creation and maintenance of capabilities required 
by future threats must also be secured ?cyber, electronic warfare, long?range 
standoff ?repower, mobility?.
The sustainable maintenance of the selected defence solutions requires a 
suf?cient level of investments in materiel. The defence establishment estimates 
that the required increase, which focuses mainly on the maintenance of 
capabilities, of military defence appropriations will come to approximately E?R 
5? million in ????, in addition to index adjustments, and, gradually, to E?R 
?5? million by ????, in addition to index adjustments. Closing the sustainability 
gap of public ?nances called for spending cuts of a permanent nature in Prime 
Minister ?yrki ?atainen’s Government Programme and the decision on spending 
limits in the spring of ????. Due to the worsening economic situation and 
growing uncertainties, it is not possible to change the future spending limits in 
advance. It will be the task of the next Government to consider the possibilities 
of providing added resources to the Defence Forces, including their possible 
impact on the present defence solution. 
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Factboxes: 
Global population growth from 1920–2011, forecast for 2012–2050
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The evolution of violent conﬂict
One point ﬁve (1.5) billion people live in countries that suffer from conﬂict and violent crime. 
The world has witnessed 128 armed conﬂicts in the post-Cold War period, only 8 of which 
were fought between nations. Most violent conﬂicts occur in Southern Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa and the Middle East. There are nearly 50 fragile states in the world. Weak institutions, 
suffering from a lack of authority and power, are unable to create security, justice or economic 
growth which supports employment. This can result in crises even in seemingly stable 
countries.
The global economy and modern communications facilitate the mobility of weapons, 
ﬁnancing, ideas and recruits. The nature of violent conﬂict has changed, especially within 
the past decade. Internal conﬂicts are the most prevalent form of armed conﬂict. The role 
of asymmetric warfare has increased and the role of non-state actors has heightened. Over  
40 per cent of the conﬂicts of the 21st Century recur. On average a civil war goes on for  
8 years.
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The 10 largest military spenders (2011)
 
USA; 41.0%
Others; 25.7%
China; 8.2%
Russia; 4.1%
United Kingdom; 3.6%
France; 3.6%
Japan; 3.4%
Saudi-Arabia; 2.8%
India; 2.8%
Germany; 2.7%
Brazil; 2.0%
In all, global defence
spending in 2011
was USD 1 635 bn.
Source: SIPRI Yearbook 2012
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Multilateral civilian cooperative arrangements in Finland’s neighbourhood
Baltic Sea Task Force on organised crime (BSTF)
The task force was established following a decision of the Prime Ministers of the Baltic Sea 
states in 1996. The task force plans and implements Baltic Sea states’ cooperation in the 
ﬁght against organised crime through, among other things, facilitating the exchange of 
information, judicial cooperation and collaboration in education and research.
Baltic Sea Region Border Control Cooperation (BSRBCC)
The BSRBCC was established in 1996, covering border control and maritime environment 
protection-related interauthority cooperation between the Member States. The cooperation 
also includes common situation awareness and the rapid exchange of information between 
the Member States on the encrypted communications system Coastnet. The BSRBCC also 
provides for joint operations and exercises, including a 24/7 national maritime point of 
contact in each Member State.
In their operations plans the BSTF and the BSRBCC are committed to the already ongoing 
Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities cooperation concept, in which Russia, too, participates. 
The cooperation concept applies, especially, the recommendations of MARSUNO (Maritime 
Surveillance in the Northern Sea Basin) and the BSMF (The Baltic Sea Maritime Functionalities). 
Both of the aforementioned projects were implemented under the EU Strategy for the Baltic 
Sea Region.
Baltic Sea oil spill prevention cooperation
Oil spill prevention cooperation in the Baltic Sea is mainly implemented within the 
framework of the Baltic Marine Environment Protection Commission – Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM). This cooperation began twenty years ago and it includes, among other things, 
regular exercises as well as common instructions for the purpose of alerting, requesting and 
providing assistance and oil spill recovery.
The Arctic Council’s Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue cooperation and 
the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response Working Group
The eight arctic states comprising the Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and 
Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic in May, 2011. In Finland it entered into Force in 
June, 2011. The key projects of the Arctic Council’s Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response Working Group are related to preventing and responding to threats or impacts that 
may result from oil and natural gas production, the use of nuclear power and shipping, and 
the consequences of natural disasters.
Rescue Cooperation in the Barents Region
The agreement on Cooperation within the ﬁeld of Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and 
Response in the Barents Euro-Arctic Region, signed by Finland, Norway, Sweden and the 
Russian Federation, entered into force in May, 2012. The countries organise a large Barents 
Rescue exercise on a biennial basis. 
Baltic Sea States Civil Protection cooperation
As part of the implementation of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, civil protection 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea Region is presently focused on ﬂood risk, forest ﬁre and radiation 
risks assessments. All Member States of the Council of the Baltic Sea States participate in this 
project.
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Trilateral cooperation
Trilateral police cooperation at the practical level between Finland, Estonia and Russia is 
implemented for the purpose of preventing and investigating narcotics crime. 
Trilateral border management cooperation (Finland-Norway-Russia and Finland-Estonia-
Russia) covers the exchange of border surveillance information, joint risk analyses and the 
implementation of common operations and exercises.
Nordic Police and Customs cooperation (PTN)
The purpose of the Nordic PTN cooperation is the prevention of narcotics and other serious 
organised crime. The PTN authorities have a network of joint liaison ofﬁcers operating in 
approximately 20 countries. The liaison ofﬁcers of the network serve all Nordic countries. 
The Finnish Defence Forces’ peacetime organisation in 2015
The Defence Command has the capability to lead defence planning and the development, 
creation, maintenance and use of the defence capability.
The Defence Command’s subordinate establishments are:
 ? The Defence Forces C4 Agency
 ? The Defence Forces Service Centre
 ? The Defence Forces Military Intelligence Centre
 ? The Defence Forces Technical Research Centre
 ? The Defence Forces Logistics Establishment
The task of the Defence Forces C4 Agency is to establish IT and telecommunications services 
as well as the required joint networks for the command, control and administration of the 
defence establishment and associated organisations.
The Defence Forces Service Centre provides administrative and expert services to the Defence 
Forces.
The national operators in military intelligence are amalgamated into the Defence Forces 
Military Intelligence Centre. The separate Defence Forces Military Intelligence Centre and the 
Finnish Intelligence Research Establishment have been disbanded.
The Defence Forces’ research and development activities have been merged into the Defence 
Forces Technical Research Centre. The separate Defence Forces Technical Research Centre and 
Naval Research Institute have been disbanded.
The key logistics and materiel activities have been placed in the Defence Forces Logistics 
Establishment. The separate Materiel Commands of the Army, Navy and Air Force as well as 
logistics regiments and the Centre for Military Medicine have been disbanded.
The Army has the Army Command and eight units:
 ? Jaeger Brigade
 ? Guard Jaeger Regiment
 ? Kainuu Brigade
 ? Karelia Brigade
 ? Armoured Brigade
 ? Pori Brigade
 ? Utti Jaeger Regiment
 ? Army Academy
Commands and their headquarters, separate regional ofﬁces, the North Karelia Brigade, the 
Engineer Regiment and the Häme Regiment have been disbanded. In addition, the Lapland 
Air Defence Regiment has merged with the Jaeger Brigade, the Signal Regiment with the 
Armoured Brigade, the Artillery Brigade with the Pori Brigade and the Reserve Ofﬁcer School 
with the Army Academy. Army Bands have merged with the bands in Helsinki, Hattula, 
Lappeenranta and Rovaniemi.
The Navy has the Navy Command and four units:
 ? Coastal Fleet
 ? Navy Coastal Brigade
 ? Uusimaa Brigade
 ? Naval Academy
The training of seagoing and coastal units has been split between units in Upinniemi, 
Raasepori and Turku. The naval commands and the Kotka Coastal Battalion, subordinate to 
the Gulf of Finland Naval Command, have been disbanded. The Navy Band is in Turku.
The Air Force has the Air Command and four units:
 ? Karelia Air Command
 ? Lapland Air Command
 ? Satakunta Air Command
 ? Air Force Academy 
Fighter activity has been centred in Rovaniemi and Siilinjärvi. Transport, liaison and test ﬂying 
activities have been centred in Pirkkala and training to Tikkakoski. The Air Force Aircraft and 
Weapon Systems Training Wing and the Training Air Wing have been disbanded. The Air Force 
Band remains in Tikkakoski.
The National Defence University is responsible for the Defence Forces’ basic, continued and 
supplementary education. The Defence Forces’ international courses have been amalgamated 
into the National Defence University and the detached Finnish Defence Forces International 
Centre has been disbanded. 
118

ISBN Print 978-952-287-009-4
ISBN PDF 978-952-287-010-0
ISSN 1799-7828
SNELLMANNINKATU 1, HELSINKI
PO BOX 23, 00023 GOVERNMENT, FINLAND
Tel. +358 2951 6001
Fax +358 9 1602 2165
julkaisut@vnk.ﬁ
www.vnk.ﬁ/english
